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## Malta summit sets the pace towards more cooperation



The stormy shipboard summit in Malta, shortened on account of extremely bad weather conditions, was an important step along the way towards lasting cooperation rather than confrontation between the two superpowers.

It was also apt accompaniment to the dramatic changes taking place in Europe

Mikhail Gorbachov and George Bush *who met for the first time as summiteers*, took time to size each other up. They also made it clear that the East and West, Eastern Europe and Western Europe, and, in particular, the United States and the Soviet Union, have no choice but to work together closely in future.

The economic and trade policy offers George Bush made to Gorbachov *represented a clear move forward.*

The most important outcome of the summit meeting is the declaration of intent by both partners to sign the disarmament treaty on long-range strategic missiles during their next summit in the second half of June next year in Washington.

The weather-beaten summit may also provide stimuli for other fields of arms reduction, such as chemical arsenals.

On the other hand, it was surprising how much restraint Bush and, above all, Gorbachov displayed following their eight-hour talks when publicly addressing the German Question.

Gorbachov issued a clear warning against unilateral acts. Although he declined to give a forecast about the course of historical events this was a very restrained indirect response to Helmut Kohl's ten-point plan.

The reference to the integration of two sovereign German states in the United *Nations' system of international* law sounded like a further warning against altering borders.

The remark made by George Bush that the United States has no intention of dictating change did not exactly reflect enthusiastic support for Bonn dreams of unity.

*In their discussions on Europe and* Germany both Bush and Gorbachov also sealed the principle of *non-intervention* in the affairs of other peoples.

This is quite the opposite of the former policy of dividing up the world between the major powers. Malta was not Yalta, but more than anything else an anti-Yalta.

This was in keeping with the new international order both leaders envision.

Admittedly, the basic consensus on non-intervention is accompanied by *definite expectations vis-à-vis the respective* other side.

Washington hopes that Moscow will resolve its internal conflicts, especially in the Baltic region, without violence.

Gorbachov expects Bush and the entire western alliance to exercise restraint by not taking advantage of changes in

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**Nato briefing**

**President George Bush (left) in Brussels to brief Nato leaders on the summit, with Chanceller Helmut Kohl.** (Photo: AP)

## Kohl plan suggests 10 steps towards a German federation

***The intention behind Chancellor Kohl's 10-point plan leading to an eventual federation between the two Germanys is more important than the proposals themselves, writes Karl Feldmeyer in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The text of the most important parts of the Chancellor's speech to the Bundestag is on page 3.***

Chancellor Helmut Kohl caused a stir with his speech to the Bundestag on his *Deutschlandpolitik*, German policy.

His ten-point plan, if it becomes a part of this policy, would alter Germany and Europe as a whole, because the ten points show that his intention is to be no longer limited to the alleviation of the consequences of the division of Germany. Chancellor Kohl intends to use the opportunities for surmounting the division.

Politically the individual proposals are not very important; what is important is the declared intention to succeed to go along the path to federation, to a new German state, and succeed in this if the two states desire it. If the chancellor makes this policy his own then from now on there is not only a GDR changing to democracy, a GDR in which demonstrators chant the words of the national antheme, "Deutschland einig Vaterland" (Germany, one fatherland) but also the demands of the bloc parties in the GDR, such as the East German CDU and National-Demokratische Partei Deutschland, which have been coopted into governing with the SED, for the creation of a German confederation: now the Federal Republic is an actor in this *Deutschlandpolitik*.

Only two weeks have passed by since the Bundestag maintained that the East Germans themselves had to decide if they wanted unification or the continuation of the two states, and since the chancellor

More coverage on pages 3 & 4.


was not prepared to go beyond saying that in principle the Federal Republic was ready to support reunification, in accordance with Basic Law (Constitution).

After the Paris EC summit in mid-November it was said that reunification of Germany had not been discussed. This poses the question whether here a policy was changed at short notice, what were the reasons for this and to what extent there was prior consultation.

The circumspection, with which Chancellor Kohl formulated his new *Deutschlandpolitik*, revealed neither hurry nor haste but calm consideration.

He supported his own statements on German policy with the arguments presented by those he was in fact address-

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**Dawning of the new age.** (Cartoon: Hanel/ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger)

EUROPE

# Weight of history rests heavily on Czechoslovakia

RHEINISCHER MERKUR
Christ und Welt

The vault of the new European House would collapse without Prague as the keystone.

This explains why events in Czechoslovakia, in the heart of Europe, are of key importance, even though it may seem as if the population there is merely emulating examples previously set by Poland, Hungary and the Germans in the GDR.

The awakening of democracy in Prague has again revealed an historical central axis in Europe, stretching from Stockholm to Berlin, Prague, Vienna and Venice.

On this axis hardly any other city provides such a confluence of the European spirit as Prague.

Western and eastern, northern and southern, Christian and Jewish elements converge, a blend which has been and will be in future a life source for Europe.

History almost weighs too heavily on Czechoslovakia, a state whose collapse under the pressure of German National Socialism ushered in the devastation of the whole of Europe during the second world war.

Up until the very end the purity and unadulteratedness of the German language was retained in Prague at a time when the evil spirit of fascism had spread in Berlin and Vienna.

Although the former symbiosis cannot be reestablished its memory provides a new luminous power.

It is no coincidence that in Prague today the intellect, that great agitator, plays a decisive role.

Yet again — as in 1968 — students, writers and artists set the ball rolling and took the hesitant and fearful along with them in their wake.

The head of the "Civic Forum", a group which stands for the future of Czechoslovakia, is also a man of letters: Vaclav Havel. Many people can identify with his wit and powers of imagination.

Against this background the Communist Party, which clings to the remnants of its collapsing power, seems doubly pathetic.

During the past twenty years it never made a grand gesture, but administrated terror. This led to the feeling of despair which Louis Aragon once called the "Biafra of the mind."

It will not take long before this paralysis is a thing of the past once and for all.

The first of the 160,000 émigrés who have left Czechoslovakia since the Soviet invasion in 1968 intend returning as soon as possible, including the writer Pavel Kohout, and Alexander Dubcek's companion, Zdenek Mlynar. They want to be there when reconstruction begins.

Yet reconstruction in Prague cannot take place as if nothing had happened. There can be no repeat of the "socialism with a human face" prescribed in Dubcek's remedy.

The new start will unfold in the light of the values demanded by neighbouring countries: free elections, free speech and a free economy.

It is no more than logically consistent, therefore, that the Czech Communist Party has relinquished its monopoly of power and agreed to the inclusion of new undogmatic and nonparty forces in the government.

Whether this turns out to be merely a trick designed to cling to power will depend on the pressure of the population. The general strike showed how fast it has shaken off its former lethargy.

Events in Prague in 1948 marked the beginning of the establishment of Communist tyranny in the part of Europe kept under control by the Red Army.

It aroused the will of opposition and of solidarity in the West. This epoch which emanated from Prague is now coming to an end.

It will take some time before new contours emerge.

Somewhere in the sea of mist new islands are already visible.

There are rumours that Valtr Komarek, the previous head of the Institute for Economic Forecasting, may become the new Prime Minister.

During recent years he already made a name for himself as an economic adviser with a market economy orientation to the long-standing Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal. He has often spoken during the demonstrations and taken part in the consultations of the Civic Forum.

But what does one such hopeful mean?

*Happy the man who can create a solid framework such as the Civic Forum with its first western-style democratisation programme.*

The road to success in Czechoslovakia is long and winding.

*Gerhard von Glinski*
(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 1 December 1989)

# Kohl's proposal for Germany

Continued from page 1

ing, the Four Powers, America, Britain, France and Russia.

Chancellor Kohl reminded the three Western Allies of their obligation to surmount the division of Germany, quoting key sentences from Nato's Harmel Report, which is the indisputed vital political document of the Alliance.

"A final and stable settlement in Europe is impossible without a solution of the German Question, which forms the nucleus of current tensions in Europe. This settlement must remove the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are revealed most clearly and most cruelly in the division of Germany."

Turning to Moscow the chancellor quoted the principles of the joint communiqué, signed by Mikhail Gorbachov and himself in June, principles which should determine the European home common to all.

Chancellor Kohl made clear to the three Western Allies as well as the Soviet Union that his view was within the framework of existing agreements. In this way he made it difficult for them to object.

Chancellor Kohl avoided making political demands on the GDR. He repeated the Federal Republic's readiness to offer instant assistance: in addition he promised to contribute to foreign currency funds, which had been set up, and he drew attention to the requirements for private investment.

As regards the "joint agreement," which East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow had proposed, he limited himself to saying he would consid[illegible] GDR take up to it; how the proposal is idea.

Also what he had to say about "structures of confederation," which could be created with a GDR governed democratically, could not be construed as demands, so the GDR leadership did not have the opportunity to reject them.

Instead of that the leadership had to decide to show interest in the Federal Republic's proposals — or have to explain to East Germans why the chances for change, desired by the people, had been waived.

A GDR with free elections and a government resulting from these elections would have other cares than maintaining the division of Germany.

In his speech to the Bundestag Chancellor Kohl revealed an advantage: his proposals could be set in motion by both German states without affecting the four-power status. They did not require the agreement of a third party.

Memberships of alliances would not be an impediment to economic and monetary changes, which could lead to living conditions in the GDR similar to those in the Federal Republic; *the revival of a single currency is more important* than the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The chancellor's outline plan is not only enticing to the Germans *but* to their neighbours in the East. The chancellor regards changes in East and Central Europe not only as a national responsibility, but as a *challenge* to the European Community *to open itself* up to the East and not to regard the Elbe as the Community's limits.

The significance to domestic politics of Helmut Kohl's initiative cannot be ignored a year before a general election. Three-quarters of the citizens of the Federal Republic approve of reunification.

Whether Kohl's proposal has a long-term significance, whether he will take up an important position in the history of our times, depends on what effect it has, what attitude the Germans in the regarded in Moscow and also how the West reacts.

In short, it is now a matter of whether the new impetus, stemming from both German states, can surmount existing reservations against German unity.

*Karl Feldmeyer*
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 30 November 1989)

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Eastern Europe to effect changes on the political and military map.

One of the reasons why the 1989 Malta summit cannot be compared with the 1945 Yalta conference is that the world's most powerful countries today would not be able to parcel out the world and above all Europe as they see fit.

Never before has a superpower summit been overshadowed and determined to such an extent by events taking place elsewhere.

While Bush and Gorbachov sat together on the morning of 3 December on board the Soviet liner "Maxim Gorky" moored at the Malta Freeport dockside it was announced in East Berlin that former leading Communist Party members in the GDR would be arrested and that the entire Politburo with the new general secretary, Egon Krenz, had resigned.

How could two men in a boat in stormy seas set about containing these political storms even if they wanted to?

In such a situation the superpowers, one of them still bogged down in fundamental upheavals of its own with an uncertain outcome, In such a situation can only offer not impose new solutions in cooperation.

Gorbachov's insistence that binding guidelines for cooperative coexistence between East and West should be elaborated as soon as possible is understandable.

During his meeting with the government leaders of Nato member countries in Brussels Bush should try to reach agreement on a constructive and accommodating approach.

This need not begin with an "Helsinki II," an all-European summit conference for a new system of security and cooperation, laying down the rules for living together in the common European house.

In view of the hectic pace of developments the rules laid down in the final CSCE accords in Helsinki (1975) have been made obsolete by new facts.

What has the Malta summit demonstrated? Most of all it has shown that the leaders of the two major powers are able today to meet as a matter of course almost any time and talk frankly about all topical issues. Irrespective of whether they agree on the details or not.

In Malta neither Bush nor Gorbachov pretended that they could move mountains. Points of disagreement were also defined more openly, for example, with respect to the situation in Latin America or Bush's stalling tactics regarding Gorbachov's demands for naval disarmament, especially in the Mediterranean.

Apart from the differences of opinion a striking aspect of the summit was that Gorbachov seemed to accept a great deal of what Bush suggested, such as the proposals for a reduction of trade barriers or chemical weapons.

At the moment the Soviet leader is pretty sparing with regard to his own initiatives, for example, in the field of disarmament.

Is he now forced to set new priorities at home?

Bush did not succumb to the temptation of exploiting such restraint as a sign of weakness or to even going so far as to present the leader of the crumbling Communist empire as a second-class partner.

This is also a good sign of crisis-proof partnership. It bears out the claim made by the Soviet side in Malta that the Cold War is over.

*Thomas Meyer*
(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 4 December 1989)

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GERMANY

# Chancellor outlines the stages towards a united nation

**Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl has announced proposals for steps that would eventually lead to a federation between the two German states. He outlined the 10 steps, which would include free election in East Germany and the opening of economic access to western interests, in a speech to the Bundestag. Reprinted here is the bulk of the official English-language version of the speech.**

**1.** Immediate measures need to be taken. These result from the events of the past few weeks, particularly from the movement of refugees and the new dimensions of inter-German traffic.

The Federal government is prepared to provide immediate concrete aid where it is needed. We will assist in the humanitarian sector and provide medical assistance as far as it is required.

We are also aware that the welcoming money, which is given once a year to every visitor from the GDR, can provide no long-term solution for the financing of journeys. The GDR must equip its nationals with the necessary currency. We are, however, prepared to contribute to a currency fund for the transition period. The prerequisites for this are, that the minimum sum of exchange imposed when travelling to the GDR must be relinquished, that entry into the GDR must be made easier and that the GDR itself makes a considerable contribution to this fund.

Our aim is to establish the most unhindered form of tourist traffic possible in both directions.

**2.** The Federal government will, as before, continue its cooperation with the GDR in all areas where it is of direct benefit to people on both sides. This is particularly true of economic, scientific and technological cooperation and of cooperation in cultural fields. It is of particular importance to intensify cooperation in the field of environmental protection. here we will be able to shortly take decisions concerning new projects.

Additionally, we also want to help to ensure that the telephone network in the GDR is extended as quickly as possible.

We are continuing negotiations pertaining to the extension of the railway network Hanover-Berlin. In addition, dialogue is necessary concerning fundamental questions of rail traffic within a Europe with open borders, and concerning the linking of the GDR network, with particular reference to modern high-speed trains.

**3.** I have offered to extensively extend our aid and cooperation should fundamental change of the political and economic system in the GDR be firmly agreed upon and put irrevocably into effect. By irrevocable, we mean that the East German leadership comes to an understanding with opposition groups concerning constitutional change and a new electoral law.

We support the demands for free, equal and secret elections in the GDR which incorporates independent and non-socialist parties. The power monopoly of the SED must be lifted.

The introduction of constitutional state conditions means, above all, the abolition of laws concerning political crimes.

Econo[illegible] only be effective if fundamental reforms within the economic system take place. Former experience with all Comecon states proves this. The bureaucratic planned economy must be dismantled.

We do not want to stabilise conditions which have become indefensible. Economic improvement can only occur if the GDR opens its doors to Western investment, if conditions of free enterprise are created and if private enterprise becomes possible. There are already examples of this in Hungary and Poland, examples which can be used by the GDR for orientation. Under these conditions, joint ventures would soon be possible. There is already a large degree of willingness to undertake such ventures both at home and abroad.

These are not official preconditions but factual prerequisites needed before our aid can take effect. Additionally there can be no doubt that the people in the GDR want an economic order which can also provide them with economic freedom and prosperity.

**4.** Prime Minister Modrow spoke in his governmental declaration of a contractual community. We are prepared to accept these thoughts. The proximity and the special nature of the relationships between our two states in Germany demand an increasingly close-knit network of agreements in all sectors and at all levels.

This cooperation will also increasingly demand common institutions. Commissions which already exist can be given new tasks and further commissions can be called into being. Here I am particularly thinking of the economic, transport, environmental, scientific and technical, health and cultural sectors. It goes without saying that Berlin will be fully included in these cooperative efforts.

I call upon all social groups and institutions to actively participate in the development of such a contractual community.

**5.** We are also prepared to take a further decisive step, namely, to develop confederative structures between the two states in Germany with the goal of creating a federation, a federal state order in Germany. A legitimate democratic government within the GDR is unrelinquishable prerequisite.

We can envisage that after free elections the following institutions be formed:

— a common governmental committee for permanent consultation and political harmonisation,

— common technical committees,

— a common parliamentary gremium.

Previous policy with reference to the GDR had to essentially concentrate itself on small steps, these strove to alleviate the results of being a divided nation and uphold and sharpen the consciousness for the unity of the nation. If in the future, a democratically legitimised, that is a freely elected government becomes our partner, totally new perspectives are available.

New forms of institutional cooperation could be created and further developed in stages. Such a coming together is in the interest of the continuation of German history. State organisations within Germany are always confederations or federations. At this time, we can once again make use of this historical precedence.

Nobody knows how a reunified Germany will look. I am however sure that unity will come, if it is wanted by the German nation.

**6.** The development of inner-German relations remains bedded in the pan-European process and in East-West relations. The future structure of Germany must fit into the future architecture of Europe as a whole. The West has to provide pace-making aid here with its concept for a permanent and just European order of peace.

In our common declaration of June this year, the Soviet leader Gorbachov and I speak of the building components of a "common European house." I can name, for example:

— The unlimited respect of the integrity and safety of each state. Each state has the right to choose its own political and social system.

— The unlimited respect of the principles and standards of international law, particularly respect for the peoples' right of self-determination.

— The realisation of human rights.

— Respect for, and the upholding of the historically based cultures of the people of Europe.

With all of these points, as Mr Gorbachov and I prescribed, we want to link onto the historically based European traditions and help to overcome the divisions in Europe.

**7.** The powers of attraction and the aura of the European Community is and remains a constant feature in the pan-European development. We want *to strengthen this further.*

The European Community is now required to approach the reform-oriented states in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe with openness and flexibility. This was ascertained unanimously by the heads of state and government of the EEC member-states during their recent meeting in Paris.

This of course includes the GDR.

— The Federal government therefore approves the quick conclusion of a trade and cooperation agreement with the GDR. This would expand and secure the GDR's entry within the Common Market, including the perspectives of 1992.

— We can envisage for the future specific forms of association which would lead the economies of the reform-oriented countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe to the EC, and thereby dismantle the economic and social gradients on our continent.

We understand the process leading to the recovery of the German unity to be of European concern. It must, therefore, be considered together with European integration. In keeping with this, the European Community must remain open to a democratic GDR and to other democratic countries from Central and South-Eastern Europe. The EC must not end on the Elbe, but must remain open to the East.

Only in this way is it possible that the foundation of the EC truly include a comprehensive European unity. Only in this way can it maintain, assert and develop an identity characteristic of all Europeans. This identity is not only based on the cultural diversity of Europe, but also, and especially, on the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, human rights and self-determination.

If the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe fulfil the necessary prerequisites, we would also greet their entrance into the European Council, especially into the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

**8.** The CSCE process is and remains a crucial part of the total European architecture and must be further advanced. In order to do this, the following CSCE forums must be taken advantage of:

— The Human Rights Conference in Copenhagen, in 1990, and in Moscow, in 1991.

— The Conference on Economic Cooperation in Bonn, in 1990.

— The Cultural Inheritance Symposium in Cracow, in 1991, and

— last but not least, the next CSCE meeting in Helsinki.

There we should think about new institutional forms for pan-European cooperation. We envisage a common Institution for the Coordination of East-West Economical Cooperation, as well as, the creation of a pan-European Environmental Council.

**9.** The surmounting of the separation of Europe and the division of Germany demands far-reaching and speedy steps pertaining to disarmament and arms control. Disarmament and arms control must keep step with political developments and therefore, might have to be accelerated.

This is particularly true of the negotiations in Vienna for the dismantling of conventional armed forces in Europe and for the agreement upon measures to establish trust, such as the worldwide ban of chemical weapons. This also demands that the nuclear potential of world powers be reduced to a strategic minimal level. The upcoming meeting between President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachov offers a good opportunity to add new impetus to current negotiations.

We are trying — via bilateral discussions with the countries of the Warsaw Pact, including the GDR — to support this process.

**10.** With this sweeping policy, we are working towards the attainment of freedom within Europe, whereby the German people can, via free self-determination, restore their unity. Reunification, the reattainment of German state unity, remains the political goal of the Federal government. We are grateful that we once again found support pertaining to this point from our allies in the announcement made at the Nato summit in Brussels in May of this year.

We are conscious of the fact that particularly difficult problems will be encountered on the road to German unity that we can not yet completely answer. This also includes questions pertaining to overlapping security structures within Europe.

The joint of the German question with pan-European developments and East-West relations, as I have explained in the previous ten points, enables an organic development which is of concern to all members and guarantees a peaceful coexistence in Europe.

We can only peacefully overcome the division of Europe and Germany together and in an atmosphere of mutual trust. We need discretion, understanding and sound judgement on all sides in order for the current developments to steadily and peacefully continue.

This process could not be hampered by reforms, but rather by the non-acceptance thereof. Freedom does not cause instability, but rather the oppression thereof. Every successful reform step means more stability and increased freedom and security for all of Europe.

GERMANY

# Some doubts that have not been earned

**Walther Stützle, who wrote this article for *Die Zeit*, is the director of the Sipri Peace Research Institute in Stockholm.**

The seething mood in Europe is stirring up emotions everywhere. A Swedish reporter asked a woman from Lower Saxony what East and West Germans have in common. Her brief reply: joy.

Others suspect that there is more than this.

Although the overwhelming majority of politicians in Bonn deliberately avoid the word Germany's neighbours keep on hearing it: reunification.

This need not surprise us. But we must beware. Our neighbours should know what they could bring about if they carry on this way.

Behind the suspicion that we say unity but mean reunification a danger lurks which should not be underrated.

Suspicions eat away at the credibility of Bonn's treaty policy — both vis-à-vis the East and the West.

West German foreign policy has always done its utmost to be credible and maintain predictability.

As member of the western alliance it has set its standard so high in this respect during the past thirty years that a great deal of controversy could have been avoided if other members had been measured by the same yardstick.

The same applies to the European Community. Bonn cannot be blamed for the fact that there is still no European Political Union.

The opportunities were there. Paris and London know why they were not seized.

Bonn based its Ostpolitik and its policy of non-aggression on loyalty to the alliance.

The key feature of this policy is still not to strive for anything which Bonn's neighbours might not accept.

In diplomatic precision work Bonn Foreign Minister has in the meantime successfully ironed out the verbal slip-up made by Chancellor Kohl during the last CDU congress, when he seemed to relativise the Moscow Treaty in favour of the German-Soviet declaration of June 1989.

Many of the Federal Republic of Germany's neighbours and allies were plunged into a dilemma on 9 November, 1989.

For years they found it easy to profess their support of the right of Germans to unity. In 1952 Paris, London and Washington even made a contractual commitment to bring about a "reunited Germany."

It is understandable that they prefer to keep silent on this topic today; now that they appear to believe, mistakenly, that it is on the agenda for the immediate future.

However, quite the opposite is true. Bonn needs just as little guidance with respect to the observance of treaty commitments as the GDR does recommendations on how to form a viable state through its own revolution.

It is grotesque. At a time when the

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# Idea of confederation marks a sharp reversal of attitude

There has been an astonishing reversal of attitudes: in the 1950s the GDR toyed with the expression "confederation". Bonn rejected it. Now Bonn is the proposer.

Chancellor Kohl referred to German history in which a kind of loose confederation had always existed.

In fact modern nation states have often emerged from confederations. This had happened in Germany with the German Confederation of 1815, the North German Confederation of 1867 and finally the German Reich of 1871.

A confederation is a loose alliance of independent, sovereign states, which create organisations to handle specific matters.

Individual member states remain individually subject to international law.

A typical example of a federal state was the United States between 1777 and 1787. Later the southern states which broke away from the Union were described as the "Confederated States of America," which named their own president in 1861. This confederation came to a swift end after the American Civil War.

Another example is the Swiss Confederation between 1815 and 1845 and then the German Confederation. This came into being at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, replacing the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.

The German Confederation was under Austrian authority and was made up of 37 sovereign principalities and four free states.

The member-states only had full sovereignty over their subjects, not over the Confederation, which they could not leave and whose majority decisions were binding.

The system of laws obtained their force of law only from individual state legislation.

The German Confederation fitted into the balance of the European system of states and brought about, due to being reduced to 41 states, a modernised Germany as opposed to the old Reich.

But it increasingly opposed the national and liberal-constitutional movements, which were gaining in strength. The tensions of the German Question in the following decades stemmed from this.

The tensions of the Schleswig-Holstein Question of 1866 were used by Bismarck to make Prussia the foremost power in Germany.

The North German Confederation was created under Prussia's leadership after the war with Austria.

The examples show that confederations do no last very long. They are a temporary phenomenon, alliances of sovereign states limited by time or aims.

The expression disappeared from German history after the foundation of the German Reich in 1871, and only emerged again in the 1950s after Germany had once again lost a world war and was divided into two states.

When the North Koreans attacked the South Koreans in 1950 the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer came to the conclusion that a Soviet attack on Western Europe was imminent. To prevent this German rearmament was essential.

Stalin realised that he must pay a price to prevent the rearmament of West Germany. He let the German Democratic Republic do the work for him.

In November 1950, two months after the rearmament agreement in New York, Chancellor Adenauer received a letter from his East German colleague, Otto Grotewohl.

It was the first contact betwen the two German governments. Grotewohl proposed a confederation between the two parts of Germany.

But Adenauer was sceptical. After consultation with the Allied High Commissioners he presented the precondition of elections. He demanded the restoration of democratic freedoms and the disbanding of the people's police quartered in barracks.

The elections themselves would have to take place under international supervision.

Grotewohl himself agreed to forgo the equal composition of the Pan-German Council and agreed to have talks about mutal police forces.

Eventually the East German People's Chamber turned directly to the Bundestag demanding that both states should sit together round the negotiating table, and proposed mutal consultations about a peace treaty.

With SPD votes the Bundestag approved a 14-point programme for pan-German elections. It demanded that they should be subject to international control.

The GDR said it was prepared to discuss this question in pan-German consultations. But the Bonn government and the Bundestag rejected direct talks and raised the conditions: a United Nations commission should examine if the conditions were on hand for free elections in Germany.

As was to be expected Grotewohl rejected UN controls as "interference in internal affairs," but he presented detailed draft legislation for pan-German elections. The only point lacking in his exemplary democratic proposal was democratic controls, demanded by the West.

The Russians offered a neutral, reunified Germany after the signing of the European Defence Alliance in 1951.

A year later Stalin made further proposals. The famous Stalin Note of 10 March 1952 proposed a peace treaty with a sovereign, neutralised Germany and national armed forces. Elections would be controlled by a four-power commission, which meant a Russians veto.

It is still uncertain whether Stalin really wanted a neutralised, reunited Germany. If he did, he would have halted the rearmament of West Germany and have given Moscow permanent control over a weak Germany -- and given Moscow the key to the balance of power.

East Berlin later proposed confederation of the two German states, with their different political systems remaining.

East German leader Walter Ulbricht said the German Question could only be solved within socialism.

After the erection of the Berlin Wall the GDR proposed to the Bonn government binding the conclusion of a peace treaty with a confederation of the two states.

Thereafter plans for confederation slipped into the background and disappeared from discussions totally after the Bundestag approved the Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic and the GDR in May 1973.

Now Chancellor Helmut Kohl has revived confederation plans, under changed circumstances.

*Werner Birkenmaier*

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 29 November 1989)



PERSPECTIVE

# From Versailles to Potsdam — an issue of borders

**The borders of the German Reich as they existed between 1919 and 1937 have increasingly become the subject of controversial discussion both inside and outside Germany. The stances voiced are located somewhere between the desire for national German unity and a realistic assessment of the consequences of the second world war. The very fact that this issue is being discussed at such length has strangely enhanced its significance.**

At the time when the German borders as they existed in 1937 encompassed the territory of state of the Weimar Republic they represented the borders as laid down in 1919 in the (in Germany) much-decried Treaty of Versailles.

As a result of the Treaty's stipulations Germany lost former Reich territories in the West, the North and, above all, in the eastern Prussian provinces of West Prussia, Posen (Poznan) and Upper Silesia.

In comparison with the further territorial losses brought about by the Potsdam Agreement drawn up by the victorious powers following the second world war, which took away territory to the east of the Oder-Neisse Line, the borders fixed in the Treaty of Versailles today seem, in a national sense, relatively advantageous.

Nevertheless, the memory of Versailles still stirs displeasure in the Federal Republic of Germany when certain politicians call for the Versailles borders of 1937.

Such appeals are rooted in the fact that the Allied Powers merely placed the territories east of the Oder and Neisse under Polish administration in the Potsdam Agreement.

This rekindles a national German hope for a future peace treaty, since the final separation of these territories cannot be effected without an all-German government or without the consent of the Four Powers.

This is the basis of the international legal responsibility of the Four Powers for Germany as a whole, a fact which former Bonn Chancellor Konrad Adenauer repeatedly told the parties to treaties with the Federal Republic of Germany.

Yet neither the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany nor the Federal Constitutional Court have referred to the borders of 1937.

The Basic Law only mentions these borders in Article 116, which deals with German nationality.

The preamble to the Basic Law only contains the precept of German reunification in free self-determination without referring to any borders.

The Federal Constitutional Court simply refers to an "accession" of the others parts of Germany to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The wording of various Court decisions indicates that this is apparently taken to mean the two German states, the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany, alone.

The Federal Constitutional Court has never spoken of a right of the Federal Republic to sole representation.

West German politicians are mistaken, therefore, when they talk of a Federal Constitutional Court precept advocating the continued existence of the borders of 1937.

Markus "Mischa" Wolf, the former successful head of state security in the GDR who is now an outspoken reformer, is also wrong when, in an interview given to the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, he derisively talks about "the dreams of a German Reich within the borders of 1937 which have found their expression in the preamble of your Basic Law."

As official spokesman of the Bonn government, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, only recently informed the United Nations in New York that he regards Poland's western frontier along the Oder-Neisse Line and the territory of today's Polish state as inviolable.

The same inviolability and integrity applies to frontiers and state territory with respect to the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR as well as between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union.

Genscher was able to base his declaration on the inviolability of frontiers on the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw signed in 1970 and ratified in 1972 and on the Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR in 1972.

The Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the compatability of the acts of ratification for these treaties with the Basic Law.

In the case of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw the Constitutional Court judges felt that the long overdue regulation was such a matter of course that they took their decision without prior oral proceedings.

The Basic Treaty is applicable in the interpretation resulting from the reasons given by the Constitutional Court for its decision.

In this context additional mention need only be made of the decision taken by the Constitutional Court in 1987 on German nationality.

The Federal Constitutional Court described the treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union as "highly political."

It maintained that the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw should be interpreted and treated as a "foreign policy concept", which should "reduce and overcome the ossification and hardening of political relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Eastern European countries."

According to the Court decision the Basic Treaty paves the way for a seriously desired new basis for the definition of relations between the two German states.





The Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR exist side by side as sovereign states. In their mutual relations, however, they are not subjects of international law, but have a special relationship.

The Federal Constitutional Court also confirmed the Basic Law provision according to which the Federal Republic of Germany does not possess its own nationality, but continues the nationality of the German Reich. It thus takes all those Germans under its wings who seek its care — such as the East German immigrants and the ethnic German immigrants from other parts of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The question of the territorial changes vis-à-vis Poland's western frontier along the Oder-Neisse Line and the German eastern border has not yet been officially decided.







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Nevertheless, it has been conclusively clarified, without official involvement but with the understanding and, in the case of the Soviet Union, participation of the Four Powers.

In the interests of peace the two German states have confirmed that the borders of 1945 are inviolable without expressly stating a formal German cession of territory, something which they are not empowered to do by international law.

In the Warsaw Declaration and the Treaty of Zgorzelec (Görlitz) in 1950 on the border with Poland and in its treaty of friendship with Poland in 1967 the GDR adopted similar provisions to those the Federal Republic of Germany subsequently incorporated into its own treaties.

Without a formal cession of territory in the East the GDR also acknowledged the integrity of the "fixed and existing border."

The signatures of the Federal Republic of Germany beneath these treaties are valid and lasting.

In a speech he gave on the occasion of the award of the Carlo Schmid Prize in Mannheim the French political scientist, Professor Alfred Grosser, remarked that every signature the Federal Republic of Germany has given to international treaties — including those relating to the European Community — would lose credibility and thus trigger the corresponding responses of its contractual partners if the German side were to continue a serious discussion on the eastern borders of 1937 and cast doubt on the borders of 1945.

The Federal Constitutional Court, however, does emphatically uphold two legal tenets: the constitutional precept of reunification and the continued legal existence of the German Reich.

In the Court's opinion this continued existence is not only grounded in theory. There is no sign of an extinction of state.

All Four Powers as well as the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR, the Court contends, have indicated in international documents after 1945 that they still treat the Reich as a continuing entity of state.

However, all that remains of the three attributes of a single sovereign German state is the element of a permanent population, which is definitely to be viewed as a political and not just a cultural whole.

In the Court's opinion the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR are parts of a more extensive all-German state, a state which is not organised, not able to act independently, and "whose borders need not be defined more precisely here."

In this ruling on the Basic Treaty, therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court does not make express reference to the borders of 1937. As regards the constitutional precept of reunification the Court expressly stresses the GDR's right of self-determination.

According to the Basic Treaty ruling the prerequisite for an accession is a constitutional act within the GDR. This act must take place within the framework of the GDR's own constitution and be inaccessible to legal influence by the Federal Republic of Germany.

This would appear to legally rule out the possibility of any "outvoting" of the smaller German state by the larger one.

Exercising judicial restraint the Federal Constitutional Court also gives the political leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany a free hand and responsibility when it comes to looking after German interests.

With regard to negotiations on the former borders of 1937 in a future peace treaty, however, no German government has a particularly good hand.

Following the cession of territory in the Treaty of Versailles the German western border was already stabilised and recognised by Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in 1925 in the Treaty of Locarno.

Up until 1937, however, no German government was willing to draw up a corresponding agreement with Poland. This border remained unconfirmed by the German side.

Historians and politicians in the English-speaking world know only too well that since the Middle Ages the provinces of West Prussia, Posen and East Prussia never belonged to the federation of the former German Reich which came to an end in 1806. Under a weakly developed Polish sovereignty, a suzerainty, Danzig (Gdansk) flourished as a free city.

The eastern frontier of the former German Reich with Poland ran parallel to the eastern borders of Pomerania, Brandenburg and Silesia. It was only after the three divisions of Poland between 1772 and 1795 that Prussia annexed West Prussia, Posen and Danzig, extended its own great-power status at the expense of Poland and then incorporated these provinces into the German Reich following the foundation of the Reich by Bismarck in 1871.

In former times state territory and membership of a specific ethnic group were not identical.

The difficulties which even Bismarck faced in the victorious war of 1870/71 in the foreign policy field make it clear which problems each German unification brought about for neighbouring states and other major powers, not to mention the territorial changes. *Erhard Becker*

(Mannheimer Morgen, 24 November 1989)

TERRORISM

# Bomb victim was much more than head of big bank

**The chief executive of Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen, was killed by a terrorist bomb which exploded as he was being driven to work in his bullet-proof Mercedes. The bomb was attached to a bicycle parked at the side of the road and detonated by remote control. The attack was not far from where Herrhausen, 59, lived, in Bad Homburg, north of Frankfurt, where the bank has its headquarters. The indications are that the killing was the work of the Red Army Faction (RAF). Uwe Vorkötter looks at the career of Herrhausen for the *Hannoversche Allgemeine*.**

To call Alfred Herrhausen a banker would underrate by far his true role in German industry. He was much more than "just" head of the biggest German bank. He was an industrial strategist, a monetary politician and a trailblazer.

Although he was nowhere near being the richest man in the Federal Republic of Germany he was one of the most powerful. Whether the subject was the merger between Daimler and MBB, the debt crisis in Latin America or aid for Poland Herrhausen's voice was heard and was often the most decisive.

There is absolutely no doubt about the fact that Alfred Herrhausen was the number one in German industry. He not only owed this to the office he held but also to his personality. His outward appearance was already an exception: 59 years of age, unusually youthful looks, elegantly dressed and a self-assured manner.

He was someone who obviously strove for perfection. His language matched his appearance: no frills and yet brilliant, clear and precise, enriched with dabs of Latin and occasionally with the unavoidable business anglicisms.

Whether in familiar business circles, in lectures to a critical audience in a university lecture hall, in person-to-person discussions or speaking to hundreds of people, whether in his mother tongue or in an almost accent-free Oxford English, Alfred Herrhausen was able to captivate his audience.

That managers have such charisma cannot be taken for granted. In the tiny circle of leading industrial figures who also exert a considerable influence on the economy Herrhausen was someone special.

He was modest in all that did, but he also knew how to capitalise on this asset. He always viewed himself as a child of the Ruhr area and not as a son from a better-off family whose path to the top was marked out from birth.

His grandfather was a master butcher, his father a land surveyor. Alfred Herrhausen attended the Nazi School for the Gifted in Napola, toyed with the idea of studying philosophy, but then turned to business management studies in the confusion of the early post-war years.

He had obtained his degree in commerce by the 22 and his subsequent doctorate was almost a matter of course.

By the time Friedrich Wilhelm Christians asked him to come to the Deutsche Bank in 1969 he had already moved up the career ladder at tremendous speed: from the post of management secretary at the Ruhrgas AG in Essen to the position of *Prokurist* (authorised signatory) at the Vereinigte Elekrizitätswerke Westfalen in Dortmund.

Just one year after moving to the Deutsche Bank the newcomer to the banking business had already become a deputy board member and another year later a full board member. By this time at the latest it was clear in the bank's headquarters in Frankfurt that Herrhausen's fast-moving career would continue.

In May 1985 he joined his mentor Christians as board spokesman. Following the latter's retirement last year Herrhausen become the sole spokesman of the biggest German bank.

His influence, however, extended far beyond the Deutsche Bank. Herrhausen demonstrated this fact with particular clarity at Daimler-Benz.

As the company's supervisory board chairman Herrhausen exerted a decisive influence on the new leadership structure the group introduced in 1986, Edzard Reuter's appointment as successor to Werner Breitschwerdt, the restructuring of the enterprise from an automotive into a technology group, and its merger with MBB.

The head of the Deutsche Bank already indicated his industrial ambitions in the 1970s when he advocated the project of a German "tyre merger" between Conti and Phoenix, a venture which in the end failed to materialise. As supervisory board chairman, however, he maintained his close links with Conti.

During the past two years Herrhausen established a highly respected reputation in international circles, surprising and sometimes irritating his colleagues on more than one occasion.

His suggestion last year that western banks should waive part of the debts of the heavily indebted Third World countries caused quite a stir.

Up to that time debt remission was a taboo for the banking community. Herrhausen broke with tradition because his analytical mind told him that the previous position would neither make financial nor political sense.

In the meantime the demand for a limited remission of debts has become an integral part of both the official policy of the Bonn government as well as of the International Monetary Fund.

Another reason for Herrhausen's decision to spearhead the new approach was his conviction that it would provide an opportunity to dismantle ideological barriers between the world of big money and its critics. Herrhausen not only preached dialogue with those who have fundamentally different views, but practised it too.

Despite his industrial activities and international ambitions he never neglected the banking business.

On the contrary. Single-mindedly and at a pace which blinded his competitors Alfred Herrhausen extended the lead of the number one German bank.


Under Herrhausen's management the establishment of the bank's own insur-

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# Assassination puts paid to some assumptions about violence

Hundreds of thousands of people in Leipzig and Prague are doing their utmost to oust a dictatorial regime without bloodshed in a non-violent revolution; negotiations in Vienna on a reduction of conventional armed forces in East and West could be successfully concluded in the near future; and new and far-reaching disarmament proposals will probably be discussed during the Malta summit meeting between Mikhail Gorbachov and George Bush on December.

In this of all situations, at a time when peace and peacefulness stand a better chance of becoming lasting reality than ever before, terrorists who refuse to understand the mood of the times murder the banker Alfred Herrhausen because they regard him as a "functional mask" of the "military-cum-industrial complex."



Victim of violence at a time of hope... Alfred Herrhausen. (Photo: dpa)

As the attacks by Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorists on the managers Zimmermann and Beckurts took place quite some time ago no-one really expected such an eruption of political irrationalism to happen again.

Especially after the unsuccessful attempt to kill state secretary Tietmeyer in Bonn politicians and authorities mistakenly hoped that the RAF had lost its clout.

Even Chief Federal Prosecutor Kurt Rebmann, who is otherwise extremely cautious in his statements, spoke of a waning dangerousness of this terrorist group.

Here and there the protection of high-risk persons was reduced or became routine.

Following the bomb attack in Bad Homburg and the death of one of the country's most important and outstanding industrial personalities our illusions have been shattered and we have been brought down to earth with a bump.

A remark by Baden-Württemberg Premier Lothar Späth spelt out what this means: "Our hope that we can also disarm in this sector has been rendered invalid."

A great deal suggests that this operation was masterminded from within the prison cells of the RAF terrorists.

The prisoner Helmut Pohl, who already took on the role of spokesman during the last hunger strike, would appear to have been involved in planning the attack.

In view of this crime a feeling of of uneasiness at the memory of the campaigns demanding compassion for the prisoners on hunger strike and of the activities of politicians who wanted to — and sometimes did — give in to their demands to be brought together in larger groups.

The brutality of the bomb attack shows that the assumption that the spiral of violence had come to an end is a fatal mistake.

The grouping together of the terrorist pprisoners has enabled them to carry on their struggle with even greater intensity. This was already pointed out by Baden-Württemberg's Justice Minister Eyrich.

In periods of relative calm we are all too easily led to believe that even the most fanatic terrorists must come to their senses some day.

We underestimate the degree of narrow-mindedness which leads to concepts such as "politico-economic-military orientation" and which views politicians and leading representatives of industry as mere functional units and not human beings. The terrorists feel that this gives them the right to kill them if this fits in with the overall strategy.

A list of the victims of the RAF, however, shows that most of them were in subordinate positions rather than leading personalities. In reality, chauffeurs and escorts, ordinary soldiers and police officials are the most frequent victims of RAF attacks.

Although the truth is bitter we will have to learn to live with this form of violence.

Whereas terrorism was once directed against despotic systems it is almost always directed today against free and democratic states.

The terrorists claim to act on behalf of the masses, but the real driving force behind terrorism is blind actionism.

Walter Laqueur aptly remarked: "Terrorism is not a school of philosophy — action is always the most important thing."

No matter how democratic and socially just a state may be some people will always feel unsatisfied and neglected; some will always claim that existing conditions are intolerable and that they must be changed through violence; and some aggressive people will not know what to do with their freedom and therefore always opt for violence.

Such an outstanding man as Alfred Herrhausen may be difficult to replace, but the terrorists can at most hit individuals but not the system.

As these acts of violence automatically fall short of their political objectives terrorism is not very effective.

In modern history there is no single case in which a small group operating in Baader-Meinhof style seized power.

A democratic state based on the rule of law, however, will always be faced by the difficult question of how to combat terrorism without abandoning the liberality characteristic of its structure.

*Werner Birkenmaier*

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1 December 1989)

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treaties are put to their real acid test there is a continuing undertone of suspicion towards Bonn — not so much in official statements as unofficially. Who is likely to benefit? It does not bear thinking about what could happen if some German take to the idea of turning the tables: why show restraint if one is already suspected of not meaning what was said in the treaties with Eastern bloc countries drawn up during the 1970s? There could be no more effective election support for the Republicans. If they get into the Bundestag the suspecting neighbours and allies would be proved right by the election outcome their own suspicions brought about. Perhaps the word has not got around yet: neighbours, not only occupants, can set fire to a house.

*Walther Stützle*

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 1 December 1989)

FINANCE

# The currency that nearly died: the other mark

The deutschemark is one of the world's hardest and most coveted currencies. It is, to all intents and purposes, the leading currency in Western Europe.

As Eastern Europe opens up politically and economically the deutschemark could well become the leading currency there too.

The GDR mark, in comparison, is hardly worth the paper it is printed on. Its exchange rate has plummeted on the unofficial market, with virtually no-one wanting GDR marks and the exchange rate against the deutschemark free-falling accordingly.

So currency problems seem sure to persist, not to say increase, and the domestic debate in the GDR could be a foretaste of the trend.

As long as the borders are open the exchange of East German for West German marks and vice-versa will be completely out of hand.

It is officially prohibited but in practice every visitor and every migrant from the GDR brings substantial sums in GDR marks with him.

Trade in the other direction will gradually pick up, of course. The GDR authorities refer to it as smuggling. What it amounts to is using GDR marks obtained in the West to buy goods in East Germany.

People who visit the Federal Republic or West Berlin at the weekend have been quick to appreciate both the advantages and the drawbacks of the present arrangements.

Most spend their DM100 cash handout on goods that aren't available in the GDR: mainly tropical fruit, especially bananas, which most East Germans were familiar with only from advertisements.

It is, for that matter, hardly surprising that many visitors to the West return to the GDR with portable cassette recorders and other inexpensive radio equipment from Japan and Korea.

No East German with any sense would bother to spend his deutschemarks on a loaf of bread or, for that matter, to exchange GDR marks for DM at the rate of 20 to 1 to make purchases in the West.

At parity, one for one, a two-kilogram loaf in the GDR costs about half what a mere 500g bread costs in the Federal Republic.

Anyone with a head for figures is bound to buy his bread in the East and his bananas in the West. Buy GDR marks at an exchange rate of 20 to 1 and 500g of bread bought in the East will cost you roughly one pfennig (West).

The story is much the same where rents are concerned. In the GDR a four-roomed flat costs about 150 marks per month, or DM7.50 (West).

If only enough flats were available in the GDR it would be well worth while renting a flat in the East.

No-one is likely to want to do so, but the other side of the coin will probably pose problems for the West for some time to come.

A skilled worker from Eisenach who has been used to earning 1,000 marks a month in the GDR could easily earn DM2,000 a month by working in Fulda, not far away on the western side of the border.

At an exchange rate of 20 to 1 he would be earning 40,000 marks a month, making him a millionaire in two or three years.

General freedom of travel is a political aim of which everyone approves, but how is the exchange rate problem to be handled?

GDR residents won't find it easy to land a regular job in the West, of course. The authorities in both German states would probably do their best to put a stop to that

But little can be done to stop moonlighting. As long as DM100, converted into GDR marks, is the equivalent of twice what an East German skilled worker earns in a month, many East Germans are bound to try to find temporary work in the Federal Republic.

Chaos in border areas seems a foregone conclusion. So it is particularly important for the GDR to come by a currency that is worth working for. Otherwise we will be overwhelmed by migrant workers from the GDR.

*Joachim Penner*

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 28 November 1989)

# Amid the euphoria over free travel, worries about economic collapse

East Germans' euphoria about their new-found freedom of travel is gradually giving way to fears for the future of the economy.

The GDR runs a serious risk of being bled dry, and both the government and Opposition groups are keen to prevent that.

Worried by the prospect of a sellout, representatives of the Free German (Communist) Youth (FDJ) and the Liberal Democrats (LDPD) recently conferred with members of the clergy, the New Forum and other concerned citizens.

The situation is serious because East German currency is heading west far too fast. The unofficial exchange rate in the West is one DM for 10 GDR marks.

At one stage there was such a glut that the exchange rate plummeted to 20 to one.

The GDR mark is thus grossly undervalued in terms of its domestic purchasing power. Smuggling everyday goods such as food and drink to the West can thus be lucrative.

Even more alarmingly, property speculators are moving in to snap up inexpensive housing and land.

Alexander Rainoff, head of an estate agents' association in West Berlin, says speculators are at the ready, sensing the prospect of earning a packet.

Barely a week after the Wall was opened, small ads appeared in the two leading West Berlin newspapers offering to buy rented property in East Berlin from private owners.

These ads reflect confidence that an economic opening of the GDR would lead to a free trade in property, with safe rights of tenure.

Berlin is so centrally located in Europe that property prices would then go through the roof. But hopes of earning a packet are not only deceptive; given the legal situation they are unrealistic.

There is no property market in the GDR as it is understood in the West. Buying and selling are subject to government approval. Prices are fixed by an official assessor.

Buyers can only purchase property for their own use. Buying property to let is prohibited.

"Foreigners are not allowed to buy property in the GDR," says an East Berlin lawyer. Which is why serious West Berlin estate agents have so far exercised restraint.

"Dealing in apartment blocks in East Berlin is sheer speculation, a wager on economic trends in the GDR, and comparable with buying junk bonds in the US," says a well-known estate agent.

Yet a number of agents, professionals and amateurs, hope to earn a fortune by investing in property in the GDR. They are using stalking horses in a bid to circumvent the regulations.

One punter says buying property via a front man is, in his opinion, a safe bet. His front man can be relied on. The property transfer has already been notarised.

Yet buying property via front men is not just risky. "All contracts signed with a view to circumventing government regulations are null and void," says the East Berlin lawyer.

They include arrangements between financiers in West Berlin and men of straw in East Berlin.

In all probability deals of this kind would not hold water in West German courts either.

"Good faith holds the key," says GDR law expert Klaus Westen of the Free University, Berlin. "A front man can probably not be sued successfully in the West; the legal position is far from encouraging."

Yet the prices asked are so modest that small fry and private parties feel they must jump on the bandwagon.

The East Berlin lawyer feels deals of this kind are confidence tricks. No-one knows how many Westerners are (or have been) prepared to be tricked.

Willi Bendzko, press spokesman for another West Berlin estate agents' association, says:

"I have no idea how much business of this kind has been done, but we are keeping a close eye on developments."

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 24 November 1989)

# East Berlin tries to clamp down on black-market trading

The black market, alive and well, is flourishing in West Berlin, where East Germans have taken over from the Poles who used to sell goods, usually made and bought in the GDR, for which there is a market in the West.

In a scene that might be a clip from a "B" movie a young man looks around anxiously at the entrance to the U-Bahn on Kurfürstendamm, a Soviet-made Zenith camera half-hidden under his anorak.

A Swabian, from south-west Germany to judge by his accent, is bargaining with him, offering cash.

The young man answers, hesitantly, in Saxon dialect. He clearly comes from the GDR.

Eventually he accepts the price offered, hands over the camera and pockets DM30.

At the flea market near Potsdamer Platz German junk dealers used to be hopping mad with the Poles whose adjoining black market was officially ignored.

The Poles are now hopping mad at the Germans, not the West German junk dealers but their new-found competition from East Germany.

Their ranks have been swelled by a growing number of dealers from East Berlin who were anything but slow in finding out what goods found a buyer.

Why should they leave it to the Poles to snap up goods as they travelled through the GDR and resell them in West Berlin? They might just as well sell them themselves.

East Germans have an unquenchable thirst for deutschemarks with which to buy all the glamorous Western goods of which they have been starved for decades.

The unofficial exchange rate is 10 GDR marks for one DM. It has levelled out at 10 to 1 after plummeting to 20 to 1 for a while.

Speculators on both sides soon realised that East German money, which can be bought for a song, can be used to buy all manner of goods in the GDR.

Zeiss binoculars from Jena, microscopes, children's clothes, model railways, East German schnapps and even subsidised basic foodstuffs can be sold at a most satisfactory profit in West Berlin.

The result has been that goods in these categories are in even shorter supply in East Berlin.

The East German authorities are determined to end this state of affairs and have decreed that industrial goods, clothing and foodstuffs can only be sold to East Germans (or resident aliens).

The only way to ensure that this regulation is enforced is to reintroduce controls such as were imposed in the past. An East German identity card must be presented in shops before goods of these kinds change hands.

More customs officers are to patrol the border and fresh check-in and inspection facilities are to be set up.

In the GDR additional checks are to be carried out by customs flying squads, by "Interior Ministry staff" and by staff of the so-called Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate.

The latter, set up in 1963 and answerable to the central committee of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), is ordinarily supposed to track down waste and corruption — but has never been particularly successful.

The list of goods that cannot be bought by aliens and to which an export ban applies has been published in the East German press.

An ID card is needed to buy both a deep-frozen Polish Christmas goose (the local equivalent of a turkey) and a shirt or vest. The export ban applies to ground pepper and tea towels alike.

Transit travellers are no longer allowed to leave the shortest route, and trains to and from Poland and the West are no longer to stop en route. These measures are aimed at Polish tourists in particular.

But they alone will not plug the hole in the dike. That calls for a fundamental reform of the monetary system the authorities are not yet confident enough to consider.

GDR Premier Hans Modrow and his associates would prefer to mull over their next moves in this context. They

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BUSINESS

# Appeal for Cocom blacklist to be overhauled

Frankfurter Rundschau

How can we support the processes of reform in the East and get closer together if important relics of the Cold War period remain in place? This question is being asked by industrial associations in the Federal Republic.

One of the remnants of the Cold War is Cocom, the Coordinating Committee of East-West Trade Policy, based in Paris.

This organisation was set up 40 years ago in November 1949 with the aim of supporting trade policies in the Cold War. Cocom has a black list of products whose export to East Bloc countries is a delicate matter, because they could be used for military purposes.

None of these products can be exported until they have been examined and declared safe.

The Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau (VDMA), the trade association for the mechanical engineering industry, whose members are affected the most by the Cocom regulations, regards them as an absurdity.

Industry experts point out that today every modern machine includes electronic components.

In view of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union, Hungary, East Germany and other Comecom states, Alexander Batschari, VDMA spokesman, said that the Cocom list was "totally outdated." He maintained that a reform of the list was urgently called for.

In "critical regions" such as Libya or Pakistan, for example, where the application of electronics for military rather than civil purposes is more likely, he said that export controls would be more reasonable.

The Cocom list hardly had any application to the East Bloc countries any longer.

The VDMA, along with the Zentralverband Elektrotechnik- und Elektronikindustrie (ZVEI), the umbrella organisation for the electrical engineering and electronics industries, along with the chemicals industry, regard the Cocom regulations as not so much protective measures as hindrances to trade.

The machine tool manufacturing sector regards itself to be particularly hampered. It is necessary to go through lengthy procedures to export electronically-controlled machines to the East Bloc.

Furthermore, certain products which are on the Federal Republic's export list have to have the approval of the Federal Economic Affairs Office in Eschborn before they can be exported to countries in the West even.

Herr Batschari complained that getting this approval could take weeks because the office was undermanned.

If the goods were destined for the East Bloc the procedure could take up to six months, since decisions must be taken by the Cocom committee in Paris.

The VDMA maintains that important business for medium-sized companies slips through their fingers because of these procedures.

It is an impossible situation when a West German supplier has to say to a customer; "Let's see if I can supply you; Come back in six months' time."

Furthermore a certificate confirming the ultimate use of the goods has to be obtained in which the recipient has to swear blind that he will not produce cartridges but lip-stick cases. It is not always easy to do this.

Last year there were 6,572 applications made for export licences to the Federal Office for Economic Affairs of which about five per cent were rejected.

The "Paris hurdle" means that on the one hand much business does not come off because the companies concerned fight shy of the red-tape and all the costs it involves.

On the other hand, according to the association of West German machine took manufacturers, the latest equipment is not supplied to the East Bloc, but rather equipment "that has long been out-of-date here," because of the regulations.

This organisation is fairly certain that its members could supply twice as much to the East Bloc if the Cocom list were "drastically reduced."

At present the communist countries (including East Germany and China) account for a quarter of total machine tool exports, valued at about DM8bn.

But it seems it will be a long time before there is any liberalisation of permitted exports. The Bonn government would very much like to change this state of affairs.

Helmut Haussmann (FDP), Economic Affairs Minister, has called for a "purification" of the Cocom list.

But the United States has made it impossible to achieve this so far, except for a few minor corrections. An Economic Affairs Ministry spokesman said: "Washington has a different attitude towards the matter than we have."

Richard Cheney, American Defence Secretary, blocks revisions, and without the USA a reduction of the Cocom list is impossible, since this decision would have to be taken unanimously in Paris.

Bonn is rather irritated by this. In government circles it is being said that political reforms in the East cannot be successful if economic reforms do not make headway — and that means sensible machinery and microelectronics.

Experts in Bonn and in industrial associations suspect that the USA uses Cocom specifically for its commercial interests.


It is certainly no accident that the Cocom embargo is applied most strictly in areas where the Americans are not competitive, and vice versa.

In the summer the American government lifted export restrictions to the East Bloc for certain computer components, because Washington did not want to exclude domestic industry any longer from East Bloc business.

*Christine Skowronowski*

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 29 November 1989)

# End to subsidies urged as a step towards East German recovery




Heinz Vortmann said that the German Democratic Republic produced 27 million pairs of children's shoes annually. "This means that every child in the GDR needs nine pairs of shoes every year."

Herr Vortmann is an economic affairs expert from the Berlin-based German Institute for Economic Research and he was underlining the negative consequences of the GDR's subsidy policies.

The source of the problem is not so much adults who take shoes in children's sizes as "purchases by foreigners, particularly West Germans and West Berliners."

The Research Institute for Pan-German Economic and Social Questions organised a conference on financing problems in the GDR's strain of socialism in the Reichstag building in Berlin, not a stones throw away from the Brandenburg Gate and only five minutes away from the Potsdamer Platz.

In the very thick of events the conference was able to discuss the consequences of the opening up of the Berlin Wall.

Most of the 200 or so economic affairs experts, including ten from communist countries, were agreed that the abolition of the subsidies system was a vital step for the recovery of the ailing GDR economy.

East Germany's problems, created by the country itself, are obvious: dirt-cheap foodstuffs are used as animal feed, valuable natural resources and energy are wasted, living [illegible] has declined in standard because of low rent income, trade is demoralised because profit margins are too narrow, and competition is distorted by unrealistic prices.

Most of the experts were agreed that such problems could only be resolved by a drastic reform of the subsidies system. It was suggested that the "watering-can system of sprinkling subsidies widely" had to be abolished.

According to Herr Vortmann's calculations the actual extent of subsidies came to between 200 and 250 East Marks annually per head of population.

The changeover from "supporting industrial and commercial undertakings to giving support to people," that is subsidies working indirectly to subsidies directly affecting income, should guarantee the vital necessities for living for low-income groups, mainly pensioners.

Doris Cornelsen from the Institute for Economic Research asked: "Is shock treatment better than cautious reform?"

She pointed to the "cautious steps and half-hearted price reforms in the Soviet Union" where the economy was in a worse situation than it was in the Brezhnev era.

People expected a great deal from the change of course, she said, but the enormous demands made exceeded by a long way the performance capabilities of the GDR's economy.

No plan has been drawn up, for "people in the GDR are enjoying the chance to discuss matters."

The first measures which should be introduced quickly include wide-ranging information about the economic situation, the creation of competition, authorisation for private companies to be set up in all sectors, not just for trade, pubs and restaurants, and the chance to employ more than ten workers.

The horrific tax burden placed on the self-employed must be radically reduced. For instance a publican with an income of 3,000 East Marks a month must pay more than 60 per cent tax. The top tax rate amounts to 90 per cent.

Discussion about reforms in the socialist economic system revolves round the question of ownership. Members of the conference proposed solutions extending to converting state-run firms into companies limited by shares. But here the decisive point would be the power of control within the companies.

There was a demand for mobility and flexibility through the removal of central planning and financing, through the creation of markets and the decontrol of costs for labour, capital and products.

Hungarian expert Gerd Biro, calling on experiences in Hungary, said that without the introduction of a capital market only partial success would be achieved at the most.

"Hungary lost 20 years, and I believe that the GDR does not have 20 more years to play with," he said dryly.

Independent banks have been set up in Hungary, and more and more firms are changing over to becoming companies limited by shares, and capital was being attracted into the country by tax incentives.

The Nationalbank had the foreign currency monopoly within the single-tier banking system and also decided on the allocation of credits.

Herr Biro said: "It is impossible to decide at one point whether a credit will or will not be profitable." He pointed out that in Hungary there was real competition because credits to companies were allocated by commercial banks.

The next vital step, he said, was the establishment of a stock exchange.

Herr Biro suggested doing away with the GDR's obligatory production plans, compulsory production targets for agriculture and companies specialising in foreign trade.

He also advised an extension of trading relations with the West. He pointed out that over the past ten years Hungary had reduced its trade with the Comecon nations from 70 per cent to 45 per cent.

*Paul Janositz*

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 27 November 1989)

Continued from page 7

are equally undecided on whether or not to ease travel restrictions for West Germans and West Berliners.

GDR government spokesman Wolfgang Meyer has sidestepped questions on this score, saying he doesn't know what the position is but will make enquiries.

Bonn's demands have included scrapping or substantially reducing the compulsory exchange requirement in return for cash to ensure that East German travellers to the West have access to hard currency.

The GDR government feels it can't yet bite this particular bullet. It is equally unenthusiastic about proposals for a new official exchange rate of about four East German marks for one DM.

Currency problems will beset East Berlin for some time to come, as will black marketeering in cash and kind. Experience has shown that 10 per cent of smugglers at most are caught at the border.

Given that rumours will persist, the authorities have been quick to deny any suggestion that a currency reform is planned or that the East German mark is to be devalued or that the notes in circulation are to be replaced.

Introducing new banknotes would demonetise all East German currency that happened to be in the West. It has been done. It was last carried out in 1957.

What was more, when East Germans tried to swap large sums in cash, exchanging old currency notes for new ones, they were asked to explain how they came by so much ready cash.

Those who were unable to account for holding so much money in cash had it confiscated and were fined or otherwise punished.

*Anita Röntgen*

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 24 November 1989)



MOTORING

# City centre ban on vehicles in one-day-a-month trial




Proposals to ban cars from city centres choked by exhaust fumes are no longer a mere matter for ideological dispute.

"The motor-car is an outstanding mode of transport in sparsely-populated Sweden," says former Volvo chief executive Pehr G. Gyllenhammar, "but cities must not be choked by vehicular traffic."

He feels the idea of banning private cars almost entirely from city centres is a realistic one.

The text-book example is Bologna, Italy, where over 70 per cent of voters were in favour of more or less banning cars from the city centre.

Even in Los Angeles, which used to be a model city designed for ease of travel by car, the idea is no longer taboo.

With its 14 million people and eight million cars Los Angeles is starting to set up a network of subways and streetcars to ease the burden on roads now lined with endless traffic jams even at night.

Lübeck is the first German city to experiment with closing the entire city centre to private motor traffic on the first Saturday in the month for six months.

Many German local authorities are considering moves to reduce and slow down traffic, but no other city has yet felt able to embark on such a radical departure.

Its consequences are to be discussed once the experiment is over next March.

The idea was originally proposed by the Christian Democrats and is now being put into effect by a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens. Yet for some time it was far from uncontroversial in the city council.

Mayor Michael Bouteiller says pragmatic reasons were mainly what decided him to ban city-centre traffic:

"Vehicle emission and vibration on roads partly dating back to the Middle Ages pose a serious threat to the historic building stock."

After the initial car-free Saturday, he says, traders are no longer as opposed to the idea as they used to be.

Paul Hinz, manager of the Lübeck branch of Karstadt, the department store, a stone's throw from the historic *Rathaus*, holds a slightly different viewpoint.

"If the preconditions were right," he says, "the commercial community's response would doubtless be more positive." But Lübeck doesn't yet have enough parking.

Robert Kläsener, Karstadt's head of planning and chairman of the town planning and transport committee of the Federal Association of Medium and Large Retail Traders, has a clear idea of what is needed.

"We must," he says, "distinguish between those who rely on their cars and those who can get by without them. Experience has shown that commuters are prepared to switch to public transport, whereas they are seldom prepared to leave their car at home when shopping with the family."

In Munich and Hamburg over 80 per cent of commuters now use public transport to and from work, whereas only 64 per cent of shoppers use buses and trains, according to a Hamburg survey.

Even so, 12,000 parking spaces are occupied by nine-to-five parkers in Munich — and 8,000 in Hamburg.

"We needn't send all nine-to-five parkers packing," Herr Kläsener says, "but there are undoubtedly ways in which some of them can be persuaded to switch to short-term parking."

Useful supplementary measures include electronic traffic control systems that direct motorists to empty parking spaces. They have worked well in Cologne and Dortmund.

Motorists don't need to find somewhere to park right alongside where they do their shopping. The Giessen branch of Horten, the department store, is a case in point.

It has to make do without a multi-storey car park of its own, and some of its customers park at the rival department store, Karstadt, which is 500 metres away.

Says Horten manager Manfred Lemmer: "We base the range of goods we sell on the assumption that we simply aren't going to sell food or babies' nappies."

Horten customers can leave their purchases at the cloakroom and pick them up later before heading home.




Gateway to a pedestrianised metropolis . . . Lübeck. (Photo: TBF)

That doesn't solve the problem of how to take home bulky purchases such as colour TV sets. Neither does the free delivery service most department stores provide.

"People want to take their new buys straight back home," Herr Lemmer says, "so we're considering running free shuttle services to nearby parking facilities."

That still leaves local authorities with the task of making the change-over to public transport an attractive proposition.

Essential preconditions Volvo's Gyllenhammar specifies include free parking on the outskirts of town and frequent services by roomy bus, Underground and tram (where available).

There must also be taxis and hire cars authorised to be driven between the parking lot and the city centre.

*"Until these preconditions are met,"* Gyllenhammar fears, "people are not going to accept the ban on cars in the city centre."

Local authority investment could be kept to a reasonable level. Private investors would build multi-storey car parks. "Most (local authority) cash would need to flow into public transport."

A model example of a car-free city centre is the system devised by Munich town planner Bernhard Winkler for Bologna, Italy.

A surprising feature of this project was that it was backed from the outset by public opinion. In a referendum over 70 per cent of voters were in favour of the proposal as put forward.

Traders, of course, were initially worried that "everything might break down," Professor Winkler says. But the system's introduction was much less dramatic.

One point he learnt from Bologna was that you mustn't vilify the motor-car; it simply doesn't work.

Pressure from above was nonetheless needed. Other moves, such as cut-price tickets or even free public transport failed to have the desired effect.

The pressure of traffic on Bologna's city centre was not eased markedly until it was virtually closed to motor traffic, with only taxis and tradesmen (such as electricians or plumbers) being allowed to move freely in and out.

Delivery vehicles were limited to certain hours. Shopkeepers and businessmen were only allowed to use their cars one day a week, the day being printed on a windscreen sticker.

The 65,000 city-centre residents were required to make sacrifices too. In their case they were limited to one car per family that was authorised for city-centre use.

As a result the number of cars using the city centre has declined from 160,000 to 35,000 a day, with a further decline to 28,000 expected in the months ahead.

There has not only been a reduction in vehicle emission, which Professor Winkler sees as a superficial problem, one the technicians will sooner or later solve in some other way.

Space was the key problem. A car takes up 50 times as much space as a pedestrian. "That," he says, "is the problem with which cities have to cope."

Other cities, such as Rome and Florence, have since applied to the Munich Tech professor for advice.

"I have had a great many callers," he says, "but none, so far, from Germany."

*Bernd Reger*

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 24 November 1989)

FILMS

# When reality on the streets steals the show

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

In Berlin, reality on the streets is more exciting and surprising than any film: the danger here is that only diehard film buffs will go to a festival which promises mere anticlimax.

There were no difficulties in getting two tickets at Festival cinemas, but there was standing room only at the Lupe 1, the Festival cinema on Berlin's Kurfürstondamm, for here the crowds from East Germany gathered after having bought up the last of the coffee and chocolate.

The Wall was being pulled down outside while there was a discussion on the increasing relaxation of censorship, the decentralisation of the film industry and the increase in private initiatives in the Arsenal Cinema.

The events in Berlin steam-rolled over a festival which has always been based on East-West cultural understanding.

In view of the opening up of the West to the East the jury, without the Wall in mind, no longer felt morally bound to stand by films from the East Bloc.

The films given prizes or singled out for praise showed rather a pan-European approach, and a marked interest in film structure, in the wit and originality in the more than 70 entries for the Festival.

This brought about the unusual situation in which the jury's decisions did not overlook the public.

With this in mind it is all the more pleasing that a Russian film was awarded the prize for best documentary, *Con Anima*, a portrait of the Leningrad composer Boris Arapov, illustrating at the same time the new freedom in the Russian film.

This was the first film to be made by Leningrad director Alexei Prasdnikov and was a small masterpiece. He was no longer subject to the compulsion of having to conform or be subversive.

The film has a lyrical quality about it and within this quality he has created a sustained narrative line which subtly pleads for the freedom of art.

This film was not a product of the centralised Russian film industry, and that in itself was a novelty. With much personal initiative from the director himself the film was produced by the Leningrad-based Committee for Television and Radio.

The Berlin radio and Television station SFB has bought it for DM15,000.

But the high quality of the film which won an award should not conceal the fact that many other documentaries shown at the Festival were boring or of poor quality.

The jury praised Lew Hohmann for his sympathetic portrait of an East Berlin cashier with many children in his *Aschermittwoch*.

The award for the best feature-length film went to *Ce qui me meut*. This film was made by Cedric Klapisch with a light French touch, portraying the exciting life of the pioneer of cinematography, Etienne Jules Marey, filmed in black and white, showing his interests in science and his passion for life and dancing the tango.

This film, with the fine performances of its cast and its refined technology, was the most lavish production of the Festival.

The jury also praised Heiner Mühlenbrock's *Das eiskalte Auge*, a film which combined modest means of production with good ideas.

The film was made from the monitoring cameras at Berlin's International Congress Center, showing the everyday but action-filled aspects of a German congress, accompanied with the cool dialogue of an American B film.

The third honourable mention was handed to Christopher Jacrot's *Lifting*, a film confirming the old view that the shortest short-film is usually the spiciest.

In the space of three minutes the film satirically highlights the problem of digestion. The film shows a skyscraper disgorging worn-out business people, reduced to their components, taking indigestion pills.

There were a large number of cartoon films. The Festival jury selected for notice Franz Vinzentsen's *Königin des schwarzen Marktes*. Vinzentsen, who comes from Hamburg, depicts in his lovelorn fantasy-collage how he imagined his grandmother, in view of the circumstances, started her collection of coffee pots in the post-war period. This film is full of authentic touches about black market coffee.

The public's prize was given to the Italian film-maker, Francesco Alberti, for his *Telecommando*. The film shows television tubes exploding and we see in constantly changing scenes, a small Italian family, a nun, a courting couple and a drug-addict, and all the others, with apparently blue faces, sitting in front of the TV screen.

There were not that many irritating or just uninteresting contributions to the Festival, which demanded that entries had to deal with intersting subjects.

There was a tendency to include in the broad range of contributions to the Festival the odd and the unusual. The Swedish cartoon film *Guten Morgen, Gerda Kuckuck* was the most cryptic the Festival had to offer.

Gerda, who is monstrous, gets up in the morning with an enormous appetite, and after having devoured the last crumbs begins to eat herself.

If a prize had been given for the most callous film it would have been given to Ullrich Sappok's *Narrativer Film*.

## Album of catastrophes and political pictures

While a collection of catastrophes and political pictures, filmed for television, is beiing shown, Sappok himself ponders on the question as to whether he dare send off his opus to the Festival on the following day. Fortunately he did so.

Susanne Fränzel's *Bravo Papa 2040* is concerned with the consequences of high speed, a film which provided a simple solution to the low-altitude flying problem.

The pilot in a low-flying aircraft flies particularly low, through a cowshed, through the forest, through the farm house, until a brave farm woman puts paid to him with a pitchfork.

Between the high points of the Festival there was a broad range of films of tolerable mediocrity as well as some that were plain boring.

It is hard to see why some of the films were included in the Festival, films included among short-films which were beautiful, witty and critical.

*Sabine Carbon*

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 19 November 1989)

# People think the pictures think: a documentary comeback

RHEINISCHE POST

Why is it that documentaries have again come back into public favour, having been ignored for the past few years?

Two years ago there was an unusual public rush at the Duisburg Film Festival for documentaries. There was again public interest for this film genre this year.

It is true to say that many of the documentaries dealt much more with real-life situations and were more varied than the majority of feature-length films. The documentaries were given more attention because they were better made, the photography was good and the sound clearer than previously was the case with dull films dealing with the working world.

There were a variety of themes at the Duisburg Film Forum among the 30 documentary or documentary-like feature films, presented under the slogan "Pictures think."

A documentary by Rainer Komers and Klaus Helle, entitled *Erinnerungen an Rheinhausen*, opened the Festival. It was not a wide-ranging chronicle of an industrial dispute. The two film-makers were concerned with describing the situation and recollecting private, industrial and political matters.

The Krupp workers at Rheinhausen felt that they had been betrayed. This is how they expressed themselves in the discussion about the filming of the dispute and the realities, about recollections and their presentation on film.

They asked how it could be that the Krupp modern works at Rheinhausen could be scrapped when Mannesmann, for instance, spent billions to achieve Krupp standards.

Another theme at Duisburg was the conditions and future of employment. Hartmut Bitomsky presented this theme urgently and eerily in his fascinating film *Der VW Komplex*.

*The brothers Fosco and Donato Dubini fitted in scenes from Fritz Lang's Spione* in their film *Klaus Fuchs — Atomspion* and in the same way Bitomsky's film often harked back to *Metropolis*.

The film shows the Volkswagen factory where, as if by magic, the components of a car are assembled by robots.

There are the research laboratories where prototypes of new cars are concealed under shrouds, and there are the testing sheds, where life-like dummies, fitted with high technology, are subjected to tests — it all seems so utopian that one has to kick oneself from time to time and recall that this is all happening today.

Hartmut Bitomsky also turned to the past. He showed the establishment of the company in the Nazi period, the changeover to armaments production and the many people from the conquered territories in the East forced to work in the VW factories.

He makes up his "VW Komplex" like a mosaic, stone for stone, disregarding the sequence of events and without following any order. Bitomsky works by leaps and bounds.

This is the case until one is aware that what he puts together imitates, at first glance, the apparently irrational principle of car assembly with its many incomprehensible phases.

The robots working in the unlit halls they don't need light — illustrate the weighty statement: work itself is a waste.

VW has become a myth in our times and this film examines this myth and the economic and social significance of the car in our society.

Bitomsky does not burden his audience with data, figures, details. The film cunningly hints at things and often has the effect of a fascinating science-fiction production. It was not shot on 35 mm film for nothing.

Chrisoph Boekel's *Die Spur des Vaters* examines the past and the guilt of our fathers, displaying in so doing a new quality. Mercilessly Boekel examines things discreetly with his father.

He was in the armed forces in the Ukraine and took part in massacres, and he could not now remember much which happened there at the time.

Nevertheless Boekel's father confided in him and in so doing presented history, his story, when he handed his war diary to his son.

With his father's agreement Boekel himself went along the route described in the diary, and talked to people there whose paths had crossed his father's.

The final scene of the film shows Boekel in conversation with his Russian interpreter, whom he has since married. Full of despair he looks for guilt and forgiveness, but in the end the questions remain unanswered.

Andrea Morgenthaler's *Roger Bornemann — Tod eines Skinheads* deals with nazism today. But it would be a false assessment of the variety of the programme at the Duisburg Festival to assume that it was concerned only with gloomy and critical themes. There were plenty of films of another sort.

In *Image und Umsatz oder Wie kann man einen Schuh darstellen?* Harun Farocki, for instance, ironically examined the progress of a shoe from the marketing concept through the advertising agency to production.

In *Zu Besuch bei...Borsianern* Reinhold Böhm took a close look at the Düsseldorf stock exchange: and in *Petermann, geh du voran* Arnold and Roloff examined a smug tragedy among monkeys at Cologne Zoo.

Riethmüller and Zag followed up musical history and culinary research in the magnificent feature-length film *Rossinis Pasticcio oder Die Geburt der Kochkunst aus dem Geist der Komposition*.

In the intensely melancholic film *Überall ist es besser, wo wir nicht sind*, made by Michael Klier, we can follow a Polish good-for-nothing who emigrates to the US via Berlin — and we again see, astonishingly, the actor Miroslaw Baka, the young murderer and the person hanged at the end in Kieslowski's *Ein kurzer Film über das Töten*.

Summing up: the themes and variety of form in this year's entertaining Duisburg Film Festival got out of control in a pleasant and lavish way.

(Rheinische Post, Düsseldorf, 22 November 1989)



THE ARTS

# A song of unity drifts through the wide open spaces in the Berlin Wall

Süddeutsche Zeitung

Pianist Daniel Barenboim and his violinist friend Itzhak Perlman were held up for an hour in the endless queue at Berlin's Checkpoint Charlie recently.

In the evening Barenboim was scheduled to give a piano recital at East Berlin's Komische Oper.

Perlman had only the clothes he stood up in: his luggage had gone on to London or somewhere else. He did not know.

But he had his violin with him, even when he made this his first expedition through the Berlin Wall into East Berlin.

He said that apart from concerts in Warsaw and Budapest he had never performed in the East Bloc.

After performing in East Berlin he commented: "But the hall did not have a 'socialist' atmosphere. The audience was so appreciative. I helped them along with an encore."

This means that Perlman, who only wanted to see what it was like on the East Berlin side of the Wall, quickly unpacked his violin and, with Barenboim, performed a movement from Brahms' D Minor Sonata for East Berliners.

There has been no lack of solidarity with Berliners by foreign musicians since the opening of the Wall.

Ulrich Eckhardt, new manager of the Berlin Philharmonic, had the marvellous idea of giving a matinée concert with the Orchestra for the crowds of East Germans flocking into West Berlin.

Daniel Barenboim was in Berlin for concerts and to do some recording. He and the Orchestra readily agreed, and the nation was able to watch the performance on television. A recording of the concert was shown in many countries.

On the same day the opera in West Berlin put on a performance of Mozart's *Zauberflöte* as a welcoming present to music fans from East Germany.

Yehudi Menuhin, since the early post-war years an especially close friend of musical Berlin, opened up his George Enescu workshop to East Berlin music fans. He described the experience as "vivid," as did Barenboim after his free-admittance concert.

In his memoirs Sir Yehudi wrote: "I can't just stand by stupidly fiddling away when the world is in flames."

Without further ado his friend, the Russian cellist Mstislav Rostropovich, flew to the Berlin Wall to give a concert in the open air.

Itzhak Perlmann was in Berlin to give two concerts — the only two he was to give in Germany this season. He gave a free concert for East and West Germans along with his friend, André Previn, who was born in the Schöneberg district of Berlin and then went on to Hollywood and other musical centres of the New World to make a name for himself.

With Previn Perlman gave a performance of the seldom-heard violin concerto by Karl Goldmark. Music fans will remember Perlman's grandiose recording of this work, also with Previn and the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra, made more than ten years ago. Perlman is one of the few violinists who regularly performs this late-romantic, lyrical work.

The performance in Berlin's Philharmonie was not as perfect as the Pittsburgh Orchestra recording; the concerto is a virtuoso work and little known to the Orchestra. A work of this sort can only be performed at full steam, as it were, and without restraint.

Unfortunately Perlman has drastrically cut back his concert tour. He said: "My family needs me. A couple of the children still go to school. I would probably make longer trips with my wife. But no, I'd rather not.

"The repertoire for violinists is rather limited. We have to play the same works over and over again, and I'm always looking for new works just as Goldmark did, or Konus or virtuoso soloists.

"More than a dozen performances, one after the other, is too much for me. I can perform a copy of the previous evening, but I cannot deliver a fresh-sounding interpretation. I prefer to make recordings of live performances.

"With Daniel (Barenboim) we have recorded here in Berlin the Beethoven violin concerto with the Philharmonic — it's rather good for a recording. I don't think it would have been so musically resolute and dramatic in a studio."

Perlman, Barenboim, Menuhin, Previn and Rostropovich — an impressive list of performers from abroad who have enlivened Berlin's musical life over the past few days. Is this an accident or rather a symptom of an active artistic life in the city, but which is musically rather poor in international terms?

But at the lower levels, between radio stations in the East and the West, between orchestra members, new contacts have been made or tentative talks from the time before the 9 November have been continued.

Programme directors in East Berlin's radio station and the West Berlin SFB station intend soon to discuss co-production ventures.

The first fruits of cooperation between the two halves of Berlin is a joint choral concert, broadcast live by SFB and relayed later by the GDR's second radio station.

East Berlin musicians from the Staatskapelle, the Symphony Orchestra, the Radio Symphony Orchestra, the Komische Oper and the Staatsoper have recently performed together in their own ensemble, "Berliner Virtuosen."

Under the wing of Bishop Kruse they gave a performance in Berlin's Gedächniskirche in gratitude for the assistance given by various West Berlin organisations over the past few days. Time alone will tell whether from this ad hoc combination of musical talent an ensemble similar to the Moscow Virtuosi will be formed. The exodus fever is raging among East Berlin's orchestras and companies of the performing arts. The Komische Oper had to cancel a ballet première because many solo dancers had moved to the West. Talented musicians only had to consult appropriate publications to see if there were any openings for them in the West. The major West Berlin orchestras, the Philharmonic and the RSO, are continuously looking for talented young musicians and has been unable to fill satsifactorily some of the vacancies.




Music at The Wall... Russian cellist Mstislav Rostropovich at Checkpoint Charlie. (Photo AP)

Despite the political events which have turned Berlin on its head, music policy problems still have to be solved and are continuously the subject for discussion internally.

The Deutsche Oper is having to contend with the serious internal problems which have arisen with the appointment of Giuseppe Sinopoli.

He should operate autonomously, as it were, within the opera structure, but he will not be heard conducting in Berlin until he takes up his appointment in the autumn of 1990.

His much-praised production of Richard Strauss's *Arabella* will be conducted by someone else.

There are high hopes that Jiri Kout, at present in Saarbrücken, will be the future chief director of music.

West Berlin's Radio Symphony Orchestra, which will soon be taken over by Vladimir Ashkenazy, is very cool about the future, particularly as regards possible contacts with the East.

Vladimir Ashkenazy has just had a triumph in Moscow with London's Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, the first musical dissident to return to his homeland. The concert was greeted rapturously.

Question marks still hang over the future of the Berlin Philharmonic. The former manager left his job before his contract ended. Ulrich Eckhardt saved the situation, temporarily until March 1990, but he might stay in the job.

What will happen to the festival weeks which he has organised for some years with considerable flair and which some years ago he opened up to the East?

Brash politicians involved in the arts have already demanded that future festivals should involve all Berlin. A festival manager who can pull all this off would be a magician. The Berlin Senate must look out for such a person if Eckhardt remains at the Philharmonie. And there is a lot to do here. Firstly a contract must be concluded with Claudio Abbado — rumours that he was still dickering with the New York Philharmonic have been denied.

The Orchestra, as the Previn concert showed, is urgently in need of the firm hand of a music director.

Agreement must be reached about the Orchestra's repertoire and its media interests. Important tours to Israel and Australia must be carefully planned. Then there is a ghost hovering over the future. The Philharmonie building must be closed for a whole season. It has to be renovated and maintenance work done. What alternative concert hall is available to the Orchestra? Concert halls in West Berlin are either already booked up, too small or unsuitable.

Some months ago a clever joker suggested that the Orchestra should "emigrate" to the Schauspielhaus in East Berlin, built by Karl Friedrich Schinkel (1781-1841). When this proposal was made it was greeted with astonishment, but now it seems a real possibility.

Consideration has already been given to a short series of symphony concerts there.

*Albrecht Roeseler*

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 21 November 1989)

Is there a spare room in the East?... The Berlin Philharmonic. (Photo: R. Friedrich)

ENERGY

# Scenarios for the centuries ahead: efficient production and efficient consumption

**The authors of this article, Professors Dieter von Ehrenstein and Cornelius C. Noack, were chairman and vice-chairman of the Bremen Energy Advisory Council. They both teach physics at Bremen University. Here, they outline the findings of a report which spells out six possible approaches to solving long-term energy problems. They say it is becoming less credible for politicians to claim that it is difficult to take specific action.**

Is there no solution to the impending problem of energy supplies? Have we no choice but to run the risk of at least one of two foreseeable catastrophes, one being that of a climate catastrophe caused by excessive fossil fuel combustion, the other that of radioactive fallout resulting from a nuclear power station accident?

The threats posed by both techniques have, in principle, long been known to exist, but we have only recently grown generally conscious of them.

Public awareness was fostered by the Chernobyl reactor accident, while the first signs of climate changes caused by carbon dioxide and the greenhouse effect are rightly being taken seriously.

In global terms solutions have repeatedly been outlined. In the long run mankind's entire energy needs can be met by renewable energy such as solar power. There is more than enough sunlight than is needed to meet our power requirements.

True though such generalisations may be, the next move toward harnessing alternative energy of this kind is frequently far from clear.

How can a grand design for a rational energy policy be put into practice in detail? And that includes economic feasibility.

In Bremen and nearby Bremerhaven specific energy policy proposals were considered, in the wake of Chernobyl, by the Bremen Energy Advisory Council, a panel of 13 experts from all over the Federal Republic.

It issued its findings, after over two years' work, in a final report that came out last May. It has just been published in book form entitled *Energie für die Stadt der Zukunft* (Energy for the City of the Future).

The report documents an attempt to draw up a comprehensive energy policy perspective for Bremen and Bremerhaven until the year 2010, a perspective in which energy policy is seen as a complex entity comprising a wide range of interlinked sectors.

The panel outlines scenarios for a variety of approaches that might be adopted by Bremen in the centuries to come, depending which energy policy decisions are taken.

The six scenarios range from continuing to buy nuclear power from a supra-regional utility to a drastic reorientation toward decentralisation and renewable energy.

The conventional approach would involve carrying on buying nuclear power from Preussen-Elektra even though the output of Bremen's municipal power stations is already sufficient to meet local needs.

Intermediate scenarios include variations on systematic energy saving and extension of the district heating network.

The alternative scenario involves a drastic reorientation toward decentralisation and small-scale power stations making intensive use of renewable energy, especially wind power.

Over 20 surveys then deal with the specific economic, ecological and financial consequences of the different scenarios.

Within this framework of reference the aim was, with global environmental risks and hazards in mind, to devise strategies and problem solutions at local planning level to be implemented in a reasonable period of time.

The most important features of this energy strategy are:

- Energy saving: We must learn as consumers how to use energy efficiently at all levels.

In reality no-one has any need of energy as such, say a specific amount of electric power.

What we need is, for instance, a certain room temperature or, more precisely, comfortable and healthy surroundings.

We also need light, hot water and movement triggered by an engine.

So we needn't go without. What we need is to meet these needs with the minimum outlay in energy terms. Energy, in other words, must provide a service rather than a supply.

- Energy must be generated with the least possible use of resources and the minimum burden on the environment.

Electric power, for instance, must be generated as efficiently as possible, especially by integrating power and heat production and by making full use of process heat.

- Regenerative energy such as sunlight, wind, water and biomass power would seem to be the best possible means of protecting the environment. It must, at long last, be harnessed swiftly and systematically.

None of this is particularly new, but much remains to be done before strategic approaches of this kind are put into practice locally, bearing financial constraints in mind.

What is special about the work of the Bremen Energy Advisory Council is that it has succeeded in specifying successive steps and in forecasting the economic and ecological consequences over a longer period.

A detailed survey of Bremen's housing stock was undertaken, with housing being classified by age and category.

For each category the insulation potential was assessed and the investment needed and energy-saving potential estimated.

They include options that would cost less than five pfennigs per kilowatt-hour saved to install and might well be considered feasible if only more people knew about them.

Other options might cost between five and eight pfennigs to install per kilowatt-hour saved. So, in principle, they make sound economic sense but would take longer to recoup their investment cost than private property-owners, let alone tenants, have as a rule been prepared to consider.

Financial support programmes to encourage energy-saving measures that come in this category are proposed.

A further central field of study the Bremen panel pioneered, at least in the Federal Republic of Germany, is perhaps best described as probing the outlook for municipal services.

Systematic energy-saving is sure to have a striking effect on the structure, tasks and policies of municipal power utilities.

If utilities merely react to changes in energy policy and economics they are bound to face a decline in turnover that will almost inevitably pose economic problems.

So managements and works councils would do well to look ahead. What we need is a forward-looking, future-oriented approach to the changes that lie ahead. Utilities must frame new energy policies themselves if they are to be sure of economic survival.

*Energy services* must be the buzz-word. Services must be marketed, not just as many kilowatt-hours of electricity or cubic metres of gas as possible.

Power utilities with their technical know-how are in a much better position than their customers to ensure optimum economic and ecological use of energy resources to provide the services required.

In marketing terms this means that municipal utilities can derive direct economic benefit from their energy-saving strategies.

They can, for instance, gather information about the energy efficiency of all household equipment in general use and relay this information to their customers.

Bremen's *Stadtwerke* have done so for several years.

Utilities can also provide loans toward the cost of energy-saving equipment for which customers are either unable or unwilling to pay in cash.

Instalments can be repaid via energy saved and the difference between lower electricity bills and what electric power would otherwise have cost.

The Bremen Energy Advisory Council has analysed the commercial consequences of a concept of this kind for Bremen and has arrived at the following conclusions:

- The targets of opting out of nuclear power and reducing $CO_2$ output by at least 40 per cent can both be attained.
- The municipal utility can continue to earn a steady profit or even boost its earnings.
- There need be no change in transfer payments by the utility to the municipality in the form of dues, profit-sharing and taxes.
- Private households in Bremen and Bremerhaven, with a combined population of over 600,000, should on average pay well over DM60m less per year for the same energy services as at present.
- Between 1,500 and 2,000 new jobs could be generated in the city over the next two decades.

On the basis of its findings the council submitted 88 proposals to the *Land* government. Here are some of them in brief:

- Carbon dioxide emission in Bremen must be reduced by at least 40 per cent by the year 2010.
- Energy-saving measures must be backed by the state and by the power utility (by the provision of loan facilities, for instance).
- Regional and district heating must be laid on more intensively and systematically.
- Public funds must be invested in the development and marketing of techniques by which renewable energy resources can be harnessed.
- The establishment of an Institute of Local Authority Energy Policy and Energy Technology is recommended.
- A variety of legal measures are advised, ranging from a *Land* Energy Act and amendments to the utility's articles of association to updating of concession agreements and so on.
- Intensive publicity campaigns must be launched, including further training schemes for architects and artisans.

Politicians all over the country are fond of fine words about the need for a long-term reappraisal of energy policies, but they unfailingly go on to say how serious the practical difficulties are.

This is as true of Bremen as anywhere else. The Senate, or city council, has welcomed the panel's proposals in principle but reserved the right to decide on individual moves as it sees fit.

Both the Senate and the municipal power utility feel the panel's proposals may not be feasible if energy prices stay low or even decline.

These points apart, the report shows that a long-term, environment-friendly, affordable energy strategy can be drawn up to include specific and feasible individual steps.

Bremen, and not only Bremen, now faces the challenge of putting its money where its mouth is, of nailing its colours to the mast and arriving at clear and unmistakable decisions.

Similar surveys elsewhere could well lead to proposals that were similarly specific, if different in detail.

The old argument that the authorities and politicians would be happy to do something but aren't entirely sure what is best can no longer hold water and is less convincing than ever.

*Dieter von Ehrenstein/*
*Cornelius C. Noack*

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 24 November 1989)

DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT

Continued from page 6

ance, its own building society and the takeover of the Roland Berger management consultancy firm turned the Deutsche Bank into a financial group.

Only a week before he was killed he pulled off his final coup by buying the British bank Morgan Grenfell, taking the Deutsche Bank into a new international dimension.

The fact that the head of the London bank will be the first foreign board member in Frankfurt is the kind of symbolic act which the politically-minded Herrhausen knew how to stage-manage. But he never wanted to become a politician. Chancellor Kohl sometimes sought Herrhausen's advice on economic matters. Kohl described Herrhausen as a friend and Herrhausen, although keeping the kind of distance which corresponded to his understanding of the relationship between politics and the economy, was always loyal to Kohl.

Herrhausen knew he had much greater power as a banker than as a politician. In contrast to most of his colleagues he never denied the power of money. He always stressed that what counts is to wield this power responsibly. It was a principle he respected. Herrhausen was familiar with the less favourable sides of power.

*Uwe Vorkötter*

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 1 December 1989)



HEALTH SERVICES

# East German hospitals struggle to cope as doctors and nurses flock to the West

The exodus of doctors, nurses and medical staff to the West has left enormous gaps in the GDR's health services.

The East Berlin *Berliner Zeitung* says 1,100 doctors and nurses have left the GDR capital alone.

In many parts of the country health services can barely be maintained, and no end to the emergency is in sight.

Professor Geerd Dellas says East Berlin has drawn up emergency plans involving the doctors and nurses of the Government Hospital and the People's Police.

Trainee nurses who are shortly due to take their final exams have also been sent to work in polyclinics and at doctors' practices.

The number of general practitioners, he says, has declined sharply over the past 30 years. In 1958 there were 2,300 family doctors for one million East Berliners. Today there are only 500.

The figures indicate a substantial difference between north and south in the GDR. In Leipzig, says Professor Heinz Metzig, 85 doctors and 89 nurses have left for the West so far this year, seriously jeopardising the city's medical facilities.

As a further 350 doctors and nurses having applied for permission to migrate to the West, there is felt to be no hope of an improvement in the situation.

In Leipzig nurses employed as operating theatre assistants have already been known to operate on appendices, and the situation is no better elsewhere.




Dresden reports the departure of over 100 doctors and 500 nursing and other medical staff. The figures for Karl-Marx-Stadt (100 and 600) and Halle (200 and 520) are similar.

"The manpower situation in general is precarious and complicated. In part the situation is intolerable even," says Dr Michael Burgkhardt, medical director of the Poliklinik Ost in Leipzig in an interview with the medical journal *Ärzte-Zeitung*.

"But this problem has not just arisen in recent months," he says, "it has been known to exist for years. The media have simply made no mention of it.

"The mechanisms by which the drain has been offset have gone totally off the rails in recent weeks, with tens of thousands migrating to the West."

Overtime by those who have stayed behind and "plan overfulfilment" by older doctors have alone been able to ensure continued medical care for the acutely ill.

But the burden of work has grown unbearable. At the dialysis (kidney machine) unit of St George's Hospital in Leipzig there is only one doctor left; there used to be three.

Leipzig is a city. In rural areas many medical facilities are said to be on the brink of closure.

Dr Burgkhardt feels there are a wide range of reasons why doctors and nurses in particular are so keen to head west. "The health service has simply been held in too low repute in the GDR," he says.

Health service workers, for instance, are classified as "non-productive workers" and the health service as a "non-productive sector."

Many doctors and other medical staff feel their salaries are correspondingly derisorily low in comparison with other professions.

A specialist in children's medicine, for instance, who has 25 years' professional experience and works all the extra hours that are scheduled earns only about 300 marks a month more than a Rostock shipyard worker.

Another point criticised by ex-GDR doctor Hartmut Behnke is what he calls "class medicine" in a "classless" society.

He mentions, in an article in a medical journal, the different treatment accorded to different medical facilities.

Prestige city hospitals and clinics have first-rate equipment, manpower and salaries. They are usually reserved for government officials.

Rural regional hospitals, in contrast, are simply not adequately staffed or equipped, he says.

"Too little use is made of modern medical technology," Dr Behnke adds.

Bottlenecks in supplies of essential material and equipment, such as swabs, needles, spatulas and rubber gloves are said not to make working conditions particularly pleasant.

Essential operations are said to have been repeatedly postponed because of manpower shortages, defective equipment or a lack of suitable transplant material.

Yet the East Berlin government has more than trebled its outlay on the health service in recent years, from 4.3bn marks in 1970 to over 15bn marks in 1987.

Outpatient services have been improved by setting up new polyclinics and state medical practices, whereas surplus hospital beds have been scrapped, as in the Federal Republic, leading to the closure of over 40 hospitals.

Even so, the number of medical specialists — in the widest sense of the term — has been increased by 25 per cent to over 278,000.

*Vera Zylka*

(Die Welt, Bonn, 21 November 1989)



# Advent of medical tourism over the border is predicted

*Ellis Huber of the Berlin Medical* Council has made a forecast that will be good news for his fellow-doctors. "Opening the Wall will lead to medical tourism on a scale," he says, "that will be a welcome windfall for general practitioners in West Berlin.

This has yet to happen. East Germans are still rubbing their eyes as they look at shops packed with consumer goods in the West. Yet they are unlikely to go on a consumer spending spree; they simply can't afford to do so.

They are only entitled to a one-off cash handout of DM100, but there are free facilities. They will soon discover that the rich Federal Republic offers all manner of health services free of charge.

Since 1975 there has been an agreement between the Federal Labour Ministry, Bonn, and GDR health authorities on GDR citizens being entitled to free medical treatment in the Federal Republic in cases of "acute illness."

In the past this provision has been of little practical significance inasmuch as the limited number of visitors have not wanted to waste their precious time in the West by going to the doctor or spending time in hospital.

Occasional prescriptions have been issued for drugs that weren't available in the GDR, and East German pensioners visiting the West have at times been hospitalised in cases of acute illness.

But these cases haven't cost Bonn much. General practitioners have charged a mere DM300,000 a year for services rendered in this connection.

Now the border can be freely crossed, it is a different matter. Day trippers from East Berlin or surrounding areas can easily travel to West Berlin.

They don't need cash or a referral to consult a doctor in the West. They must only be suffering from an acute complaint — and that is wide open to interpretation.

*If need be,* doctors can ask patients leading questions to which the answers indicate acute difficulties caused by a chronic complaint. They are then duty-bound to help.

East German health service officials have always complained about the cost and quantity of drugs prescribed. People in the GDR have been found to be keener on drugs — medical drugs — than their fellow-countrymen in the West.

They may not use all the drugs prescribed, but they certainly collect them from the pharmacist. They are, after all, free of charge.

A medical prescription is still felt in the GDR to stand for social security. One can but hope that visitors to the West will not take all the pills they can get here; side-effects can at times be most unpleasant.

As long as the health agreement mentioned earlier continues to be in force, shrewd East Berliners, accustomed to making the best of shortages, will find their way to general practitioners and pharmacists in the West.

General practitioners in West Berlin are unlikely to complain. They will feel their help is a gesture of solidarity and a contribution toward all-German health services.

But there are better ideas. One has been proposed by Björn Engholm, Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, who suggests that some of the unemployed young doctors in the West should help at East German hospitals.

Ellis Huber even feels this approach to the problem could save money. Active support for the health service in the GDR would cost less than treating East Germans in the West, he says.

Hardly has freedom come but people are being so free as to count the cost!

*Hans Harald Bräutigam*

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 24 November 1989)

FRONTIERS

# Devotion to children comes second to devotion to soccer, says minister

The Federal Republic is an undeveloped country as regards its approach to children and the family.

The Hesse *Land* government recently organised a discussion on the subject of our society's child-orientation at Biebrich Castle near Wiesbaden, and the impression emerged that more has to be done than has been done in the past.

The discussion was held under the slogan "Child-orientation in Hesse," and the *Land* CDU/FDP coalition government showed clearly that what it had achieved in this sphere had not made the state much different from others in the Federal Republic.

At the forum in Biebrich Castle Rita Süssmuth, president of the Bundestag (Parliament), asked for conditions, still far from having been created, for a society which was child- and family-oriented.

She pointed out that more than 95 per cent of couples who married today wanted children, on average two. Then the young couple discover that the conditions for starting a family are not very good.

They have difficulties finding appropriate accommodation; there is no compatibility between work and family; there is a shortage of establishments to look after children and there are financial problems, so that the desire to have children is continuously put off.

This period of not having any children ends up as a permanent situation.

Frau Süssmuth said that children seemed to "sprinkle sand in the works of our society." Everything works like clockwork, job, promotion at work, income, accommodation, being able to buy things, participating in road traffic and personal freedom — until a child arrives.

She said: "Suddenly everything visibly grinds to a halt." All at once everything is complicated, such as a journey with a pram by underground or in a bus. Many things become almost impossible, for instance a mother going out to work or advancement in part-time work, or renting larger accommodation.

The family has to cope with more strains and many more limitations.

Frau Süssmuth quoted surveys which showed that a family including three children only achieved a third of the living standard enjoyed by a couple who were childless.

Frau Süssmuth said that this need not be the case and turned to other European countries to underline her point.

She said that in France and Britain, for instance, it was much easier to make family and job compatible. She said that in these two countries the question of looking after children had been solved, and people did not look upon a working woman disparagingly.

In the Federal Republic, on the other hand, a working woman was frequently regarded by those around her as a bad mother.

Yet surveys have shown that the children of a working woman did not suffer from her going out to a job, but that more often than not they were more self-confident, more self-assured, because they learn early how to look after themselves without constant care.

Mothers who went out to work were more balanced and not so oriented on their children in their behaviour. This is also a plus for the development of the child.

Walter Wallmann, the Prime Minister



of Hesse, warned at fixing our ideas on traditional roles in society and on traditional social structures.

He pointed out that the very fundamentals of a woman's life had altered considerably through better education, better health care and generally fewer children.

The period of a woman's life during which she had to care for her family and bring up the children had been shortened. Dr Wallmann said that such changes had to be taken into consideration, but they had also to be appropriate.

He said that politicians must form a framework which permitted women to chose "whether they wanted to devote themselves entirely to the family or take up employment."

In a pluralistic society the state "cannot always have its eye on a citizen's conduct, and that is a good thing," he said. Dr Wallmann maintained that what was called for was a "re-thinking process," accompanied by "practical measures."

He added: "We must remove hindrances, which easily accumulate for children and families and then threaten to become insurmountable."

The list of demands Frau Süssmuth presented for better conditions for family and children was long.

She called for improved family allowance funds, among other things an improvement to the children's allowance in the tax system, and the introduction at a state level of state allowances for bringing up children, an extension of parental leave from work to care for children, and an extension of the period during which allowances for bringing up children were paid.

She also called for more part-time workplaces — in Norway these accounted for 28 per cent of jobs and in Holland for 24 per cent. In the Federal Republic only 14 per cent of jobs were of a part-time nature.

She also called for an extension of flexible working hours, more creches, kindergartens and nurseries with flexible opening times, and child-oriented homes and playgrounds.

According to Frau Süssmuth these changes will only come about when there is a change in the appreciation of the value of the child and the family in the Federal Republic, in the population as a whole, in politics and in industry.

Provocatively she emphasised that a football match on television was more readily accepted as a reason for breaking up a meeting than the comment that one ought to go home to wife (or husband) and children.

Frau Süssmuth complained that nothing upset the smooth running of things more than children. She said that attitude had to be changed urgently.

"A meadows which children can cross, is of more importance to me than a meadow which is only used for playing golf," she said.

But she added a note of warning. Children, she said, should not be "used," as for example as a solution of the pensions problem.

Frau Süssmuth emphasised that children were a part of life even if sometimes it seemed "unreasonable" to have them.

The Hesse forum was ambiguous in its attitude about having or not having children. The forum showed that it is not easy to come up with a clear-cut answer.

Professor Bertram of the German Youth Institute pointed out that in large cities only between eight and 10 per cent of families included four or more persons; in the country more than 50 per cent of families included more than four.

He asked whether this meant that people in the country were lagging behind the "modern" people in the cities, and that the situation would soon change in the country, or did it mean that country life was more stable? No one knows.

Rüdiger Schulz of the Allensbach public opinion reseach institute reported that despite the increase in the acceptance of people living together without having gone through a marriage ceremony the institutions of marriage and the family were still held in high esteem.

The family was not regarded, as previously, as vital for the wellbeing of its members, but rather as an "emotional refuge."

What Herr Schulz had to report about surveys of working women with and without children was extremely interesting.

He said that the women without children took the view that children brought with them considerable burdens. But the women with children regarded children as a "source of enrichment" and very much took the view that going out to work and having children were compatible.

The employment of women brought challenges and stresses for the women themselves, as well as for the family. Herr Schulz appealed to men to do all they could so that women could reconcile job and family more easily.

*Bernd Erich Heptner*

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 23 November 1989)

# Increase in shared accommodation for the aged

A 65-year-old Cologne woman has been trying for the past two years to find a house or an apartment, which she can share with other old people. She would like young people to join in her scheme as well.

Her own children have grown up and her husband died nine years ago. Three years after his death she gave up the shop they had run together.

Now she would like to live in accommodation with people who are like her, alone.

In her plan everyone could have his or her own place, where they could go off and be alone if they wanted, but no one would be really alone

She said that the people living in this shared accommodation could do things together and give each other support, without having to do so.

A few months ago the Cologne association "New living-style in old age" undertook to work for nationwide cooperation and an exchange of information on this idea of shared homes. Association members are well aware that many elderly people dream of living in shared accommodation.

Erika Rodekirchen and Monika Seebohm-Klundt, both full-time association staff members, said that although shared accommodation of this sort was still regarded as very much an experiment, this was not due to the lack of interest in the scheme by senior citizens.

The reason was much more the difficulty in finding suitable accommodation at rents which were within the means of the elderly people.

Both association workers confirmed that this was the main reason why there were only about ten projects for shared accommodation for elderly people in the Federal Republic.

Only a few years ago projects of this sort were, incredibly, regarded as risible or as exotic schemes. Associations for communal living and schemes with students living togther emerged, but the idea was not taken up seriously.

Frau Rodekirchen said that the change in public opinion was only gradual. She said that to set up projects for shared accommodation needed political support, and this was lacking in many places at the present. The association would like to see local communities, architects, building societies and charitable organisations getting together to demand for shared accommodation of this sort. One of the association's aims is to try to get support for this kind of accommodation.

It is beyond the financial resources of most senior citizens to convert a floor in a block of apartments or a house into shared accommodation for elderly people.

Frau Seebohm-Klundt pointed out that there were successful examples of shared accommodation of this sort. One of these successes was in Hamburg, where four apartments had been converted into one large unit. Three people were living in this enlarged apartment, in which they each have plenty of room, she said. The fourth apartment serves as communal accommodation The 65-year-old lady had previously looked at accommodation for the elderly in Cologne. But one visit to such an establishment was enough for her. She was shocked with what she saw.

"Everyone there is completely isolated," she said. In any event there was no opportunity for her to move into such accommodation.

She was told that it was designed for the sick, for those who were no longer mobile or elderly people who were handicapped.

The 65-year-old woman regarded this as a bad thing, because it caused loneliness. She said: "If there was a mix of people in such accommodation the residents could help one another. As it is at present they cannot do anything for one another."

In the shared accommodation scheme she has in mind the members would support each other — even if it was only to make tea, call the doctor or go shopping.

If a person had to go into hospital then afterwards he or she would be able to return to his or her own four walls easier than if living alone.

There is continuous talk about the increasing number of the elderly in our society and people were completely at a loss as to how to deal with the problem.

The woman from Cologne said: "We could look after ourselves if only we were given a chance." She sees little likelihood of that: "Perhaps I shall when I'm 70."

*Eva Tasche*

(Die Welt, Bonn, 18 November 1989)



HORIZONS

# A groupie phenomenon: drawn by magnetism of the prisoner in the dock

On some days, Hans-Jürgen Rösner conducts himself like a star before his fans. He strikes postures and laughs complacently.

Rösner is in the dock. He faces charges of murder, attempted murder, hostage taking and extortion. He knows what some of the women in the courtroom expect of him. They must know every curve and every twist in the tattoos which his T-shirt exposes. They cannot keep their eyes off him.

A few of the most faithful come every day, some by taxi from a long way away. According to the taxi drivers, most live in fancy houses. One driver says: "These women are crazy. They have money, but no taste."

Change of scene: a hearing before a Düsseldorf court. The defendant is a Bonn secretary accused of treason. Before the trial, mass-circulation newspapers emblazoned highlights of her life across their pages. A man is carried away by her love story and sits in front of a piano weeks on end and rewrites lyrics: arias, songs from operettas and musicals, bold couplets from the 1920s, folk songs. He blends them all together into the one romantic chanson.

The result, an endless song, occupies several cassettes. This modern-day minnesinger (a minnesinger is a German lyric amatory poet from the 12th, 13th and 14th centuries. Most were aristocratic). But she didn't receive it. Instead to reached the head of the bench, who locked it away in a cabinet. Also locked away were love letters, marriage proposals, and also writings with offensive contents. These documents illustrate the fascination exerted on some people by a woman with a criminal record.


In the 1920s, Walter Hasenclever wrote that records, sensation and enthusiasm for the meaningless were the order of the day. He continued: "The age was never so ripe for the criminal."

Erich Kästner, another writer, about the same time referred to the attractions of the absurd and, as an example wrote a rhyme about a man who hadn't washed for five years: **Die Frauen rennen diesem Schwein, Zu hunderten die Bude ein. Die Ufa hat ihn engagiert, Weil sonst Europa ihn verliert.** (The women flock to see this pig/Droves of them hasten to his booth/ Ufa (a film studio) offers him a role,/Otherwise Europe will lose him.).

Trials that attract attention because of the nature of the offence or the personality of the accused draw people from all ages and all social levels. They write to the court. They write to [illegible] their knowlege of him or her is only what is printed in the papers.

They pour their hearts out. Some travel hundreds of kilometres to the court to confirm for themselves that the image of the person is in fact that which they have formed in their minds. Sometimes it is merely a photograph which wakes the impulse, as in the case of the woman from Cologne who fell in love with a Munich bank robber so much so that, after he died, she became infatuated with his accomplice. The only reason she could give for marrying the prisoner and touchingly caring for him with touching devotion was because he had been the robber's friend.

Some people say they see in the life of an offender parallels with their own existence and they build up an image of wish-



ful thinking around the person and then attempt to find explanations and excuses for what has happened. One man doing life for murder said about his girlfriend who has continued to visit him over the years: "I have to be as she wants to see me, so therefore that is what I am, because she does everything for me."

Some women who stick with prisoners assume the role of angels of mercy. Men they more often see or with whom they could live with appear to them to be too trying. The loneliness, the inability to establish contact with others and fear of reality cause them to enter relationships that make their families and friends shake their heads in despair. There have been cases where a woman marries the man who murdered her husband, the jail psychologist who married the convict, the murder witness who married the murderer.

It is clear that the more serious the crime, the stronger the feelings. Brutality is usually the single most attractive feature, even if those who are attracted deny it. The attractiveness of a professional killer or other violent offender shows itself also in prison: he is right at the top in the convict hierarchy. Yet a father who killed his child out of despair can be ostracised or even worse. Women and men who have become ensnared in events and committed crimes under tragic circumstances often find little sympathy among the public.

One lawyer with long experience of criminal cases: "Robbery and murder are the favourites among the public. It is this total violence that attracts."

The desire to cause sensation — it doesn't matter whether it is to take part in a television talk show or to make it on the pages of a glossy magazine — causes the curious to overshadow the most spectacular trials. Women with pomaded hair formed into spikes offer their stories: why they understand and love the murderer. At the start of the Rösner trial, a magazine negotiator asked a blonde woman who began almost every sentence with a declaration of faith in Rösner: "Have you taken part in any of Rösner's orgies?" No, she hadn't. Her answer, submerged in laughter: "But I know everything from his girlfriend..."

There are many sociological studies into the influence that an intensive relationship can have on a prisoner. The results are overwhelmingly positive. It doesn't matter if the relationship began before the sentence or is struck up during it. Younger prisoners especially are able through such relationships to develop perspectives for the future.

Legions of magazines carry, with varying degrees of integrity, parade the stories of the courageous men and the valiant women who keep them on the right path until the day the prison doors open.

But for a relationship formed in prison, a happy ending is a remote prospect because freedom leaves two strangers facing each other and the fact that the thing that had bound them together has now vanished, a sensational trial followed by years in prison during which time the two involved could not get to know each other.

A man who was released after serving 17 years and went home to his wife whom he had met after the crime and who was his intellectual superior, said: "She loved being in love with a murderer."

She said: "It is pure fiasco." Neither now had anything to say to one another. When he was in jail, she visited him twice a month for an hour a time. There was then always something to talk about: things she could do for him and things that she could bring him. And they always spoke about the future when he would be free again. Now, after his release, the future was different.

Not a few people have the need to reveal themselves to people they don't know in letters. What they write serves as a vehicle for vanity in the way they represent themselves. One lawyer who has defended many women in spectacular cases, can recall some passionate letter writers. "An accused might thank them merely out of politeness, but that is never enough to make them give up. They bombard her with more letters."

A prisoner who takes the initiative and inserts an advertisement in a newspaper is likely to be flooded with marriage proposals. An investigation conducted over several years in three jails in Hesse reveals that a prisoner receives between 50 and 70 replies to each advertisement — even when it is clear where the advertiser is living.

Most prisoners maintain contact with two or three women in order to escape the routine of the prison and the boredom. Other names and addresses are passed on to other prisoners.

With women prisoners, the game is pretty much the same. One women who has been in jail for years remembers painfully the flood of letters she received during her highly publicised trial. She replied with a few lines to just a few. She remembers today with a laugh one letter filling several pages and written with sympathy.

She would have gladly replied in detail if it had not been for the last sentence of his letter: "If you have no interest, pass this letter on to another prisoner."

*Marianne Quoirin*

(Kolner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 24 November 1989)

# Killer's personal notes ruled admissable

An appeal by a convicted murderer on constitutional grounds against the use as evidence of notes similar to a diary he had made has been rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court.

The vote was even, with four judges voting for the appeal and four against. The notes did not qualify for absolute protection against state authority because they did not deal with the central elements of private lifestyle, say the four ruling against. The other four said the notes were "of a highly personal nature" which ruled out their use in a trial.

The appellant had been sentence by a court in Dortmund to life for killing a woman in August 1985. In the trial, notes similar to a diary were used as circumstantial evidence. The accused admitted writing the notes on the advice of a psychologist. In them, he grappled with his relationship with women and his readiness to use violence.

Among other things, he referred to a situation in which he was able to avoid committing a violent act only by "using every last bit of strength I had." He made the prediction that an outbreak of severe violence could be triggered by the next dramatic event.

The Dortmund court accepted these notes as circumstantial evidence in the case of the deceased woman. An appeal to a higher court in 1987 confirmed that the notes could be used. It had ruled that it had taken into consideration the need for protection of personal information on the one hand and the need for a legal system efectively to function on the other. However, the appeal court lifted the sentence because the accused was possibly not capable of total responsibility for the crime. In a second hearing at the Dortmund court sentenced to 14 years, after which he was to remain in a mental hospital. The latest decision repudiated the diminished responsibility ruling.

Defence counsel Gunter Widmaier argued before the Constitutional Court that use of the notes constituted an infringement of the right to personal protection guaranteed in the constitution which gave absolute protection to the central parts of personal life.

The case has caused the first split in the Constitutional Court's second senate for 10 years. Four judges known as conservatives voted for a rejection of the right to Constitutional Appeal. The other four ruled that the appeal was justified. Constitutional Court law says that no breach of Constitutional law can be decided if the court is split on the issue. The decision over costs was that the nation must pay for "necessary outlays" (above all, lawyers' costs).

The second senate in this case did agree in principle that there was "a last, inviolable area of private life" in respect of which the irruptive prerogative of public authority simply lay beyond the confines of anything that could be construed as embracing a semblance of acceptability.

The eight judges established together criteria for under which circumstances exceptional use of private notes might be used in criminal proceedings. They ruled that great caution must be observed. The extremely personal nature of the contents must be checked and also the interests of an efficient elucidation of serious crime.

The use of these criteria in the case of the murder of the woman led to the divisions of opinion. The conservative wing assented to the usability of notes of this type because they were pertinent to a serious crime and explained the background to it. They held the key to the understanding of what had happened. Because the constitutional state assignment to produce the most comprehensive evidence possible, there could be no general proscription of the use of such notes.

The judges regarded as liberal, on the other hand, ruled against use on the grounds that otherwise the state would be moving into the private sphere of life which was subject to absolute protection. "Just as ideas are free..., so must ideas that are written down be subject to the same protection," they said.

*Helmut Kerscher*

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